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ABSTRACT
This Article discusses the legal framework for sovereign debt
restructuring in the euro area—both de lege lata and de lege ferenda.
Sovereign debt restructurings remain exceptional events that come
with profound implications for financial stability and monetary policy
transmission. However, they may become necessary as part of a
financial assistance program to a euro area Member State, as was the
case for Greece in 2012. This Article seeks to contribute to the ongoing
debate on how to enhance the functioning of the Economic and
Monetary Union (“EMU”) by exploring the legal aspects of sovereign
debt restructuring in the euro area. This includes an analysis on
whether and how the procedures for sovereign debt restructurings in
the euro area can be made more orderly, fair, and predictable by
establishing a European Sovereign Debt Restructuring Framework
(“ESDRF”). Drawing upon international standards for sovereign bond
documentation, we propose the inclusion of enhanced Collective
Action Clauses (“CACs”), as well as certain technical amendment
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clauses. In addition, we discuss two options for a dispute resolution
mechanism when contractual techniques to restructure sovereign debt
fail: (i) a specialized chamber of the Court of Justice of the European
Union (“CJEU”) and (ii) a sovereign debt arbitration mechanism. The
Article makes no judgment on the economic or political feasibility and
necessity for such changes, but seeks to shine a light on the legal
aspects that ought to be taken into account in the context of reforming
the euro area’s sovereign debt crisis resolution framework.
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I. INTRODUCTION

“It would be useful to think about a more predictable
and transparent way of how to deal with debt
restructurings.”
- Klaus Regling, Managing Director of the European
Stability Mechanism (“ESM”), October 2017 1
The euro area sovereign debt crisis revealed important
deficiencies in the architecture of the Economic and Monetary Union
(“EMU”), notably with regard to two interlinked aspects. First,
Member States of the European Union have engaged in lax fiscal
policies or built up macroeconomic imbalances without having to face
any serious sanction from the market or from the European Union.2
Second, when the global financial crisis migrated across the Atlantic to

1. Klaus Regling, Managing Director, European Stability Mechanism, Is Europe Prepared
for the Next Crisis? A Discussion with Klaus Regling at the European Stability Mechanism’s
5th Anniversary, (Oct. 11, 2017), available at https://piie.com/events/europe-prepared-nextcrisis [https://perma.cc/ZN79-V6UU].
2. As Lane contends, “the initial institutional design of the euro plausibly increased fiscal
risks during the pre-crisis period.” See, e.g., Philip Lane, The European Sovereign Debt Crisis,
26 J. ECON. P ERSP. 49, 50, 65 (2012) (noting that “the origin and propagation of the European
sovereign debt crisis can be attributed to the flawed original design of the euro’” and that the
“European sovereign debt crisis . . . provides an opportunity to implement reforms that are
necessary for a stable monetary union but that would not have been politically feasible in its
absence”). With respect to the first deficiency, it is submitted by several commentators that
reliance on “soft” mechanisms to ensure compliance with the debt ceiling set out in the Stability
and Growth Pact (“SGP”). Between the years 1998 and 2012, fourteen countries violated the
public debt rules of the SGP more than 120 times, raising serious doubts about the framework’s
effectiveness in ensuring sound fiscal policies. See Michael A. Hansen, Explaining Deviations
from the Stability and Growth Pact: Power, Ideology, Economic Need or Diffusion?, 35 J. P UB.
P OL’ Y 477, 481, 479 n.1 (2015).
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Europe, the EMU framework lacked fiscal instruments to address acute
financing difficulties that arose in both the private 3 and public sector. 4
Policymakers in Europe have sought to address the outlined
problems, most of which came to the fore during the crisis, by
significantly reshaping EMU governance and introducing various crisis
resolution mechanisms. For instance, the establishment of a Banking
Union 5—together with the changes introduced by the Banking
Recovery and Resolution Directive 6—seeks to prevent taxpayerfunded bailouts of banks in the future and cushion the adverse effects
of “sovereign-bank feedback loop.” 7 In addition, the European
Stability Mechanism (“ESM”) is an international financial institution
which functions as a lender of last-resort on the basis of an intergovernmental treaty between the nineteen euro area governments. 8 The
total lending capacity of the ESM is EU€500 billion, which almost
matches the total quota resources of the International Monetary Fund

3. See, e.g., HANS GEEROMS & PAWL KARBOWNIK, A MONETARY UNION REQUIRES A
BANKING UNION (2014), available at https://www.coleurope.eu/system/files_force/researchpaper/beep33.pdf?download=1.
4. Crucially, the infamous “sovereign-bank feedback loop” rendered it close to impossible
to disentangle private and public balance sheets, making it difficult to resort to burden-sharing
mechanisms to reduce debt levels in either sphere. Indeed, fears of sovereign default undermined
confidence in the private banks that held much sovereign debt, forcing these banks to contract
their balance sheets, driving the price of sovereign debt still lower.
5. See e.g., J ENS-HINRICH B INDER & CHRISTOS V. GORTSOS, T HE EUROPEAN
B ANKING
UNION:
A
C OMPENDIUM (2015);
DANNY
B USCH
&
GUIDO
FERRARINI, EUROPEAN B ANKING UNION (2015); GIUSEPPE B OCCUZZI, T HE EUROPEAN
B ANKING UNION: SUPERVISION AND R ESOLUTION (2016); Andreas Dombret, European
Financial Integration: Monetary Union, Banking Union, Capital Markets Union, in EQUITY
MKTS. IN TRANSITION 565–73 (2017).
6. Directive 2014/59/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014
Establishing a Framework for the Recovery and Resolution of Credit Institutions and Investment
Firms and Amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC,
2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and
Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the
Council Text with EEA relevance, 2014 O.J. (L, 12.6.2014) 190.
7. See, e.g., Heather Gibson, Stephen Hall & George Tavlas, Self-fulfilling Dynamics: The
Interactions of Sovereign Spreads, Sovereign Ratings and Bank Ratings During the Euro
Financial Crisis, 73 J. INT’ L MONEY & FIN . 371 (2017) (finding that sovereign ratings,
sovereign spreads, and bank ratings strongly interacted with each other during the euro crisis,
confirming strong doom-loop effects).
8. For an overview of the ESM and its legal framework, see, e.g., Christoph Ohler, The
European Stability Mechanism: The Long Road to Financial Stability in the Euro Area, 54
GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L. 47 (2011). Also compare more recently Jefferey Atik, From ‘No Bailout’
to the European Stability Mechanism, 39 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1201 (2015).
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(“IMF”) of around US$645 billion. 9 In addition, EMU governance and
policy coordination was further strengthened through several new
instruments to prevent and manage financial crises in the European
Union. 10
However, some argue that these reforms are not sufficient to
address situations of sovereign insolvency, i.e., when an analysis of the
Member State’s debt sustainability yields a negative result. 11 While the
ESM may have sufficient resources to provide liquidity to a Member
State in crisis, its funds may be rapidly depleted if the country is
confronted with unsustainable levels of debt. 12 This is because any
crisis resolution framework that involves a lender of last resort for
countries, such as the ESM or the IMF, is based on the premise that no
credit can be extended to a country that will not be able to repay in the
future. 13
With respect to the euro area, the key question therefore is
whether the ESM framework should feature a mechanism to restructure
sovereign bonds in cases were the country’s debt is deemed

9. ETIENNE DE L HONEUX & C HRISTOS V ASSILOPOULOS, T HE EUROPEAN STABILITY
MECHANISM B EFORE THE EUROPEAN COURT OF J USTICE (2014).
10. See, e.g., for an overview of the evolution of EMU after the crisis from a legal point
of view, Päivi Leino & Tuomas Saarenheimo, Sovereignty and Subordination: On the Limits of
EU Economic Policy Coordination, 43(1) EUR. L. REV. 166 (2017). For an economic analysis,
see, e.g., Heather D. Gibson, Theodore Palivos & George S. Tavlas, The Crisis in the Euro Area:
An Analytical Overview, 39 J. MACROECONMICS 233 (2014).
11. One problem that is frequently cited in this context is the so-called “home bias,” which
reflects the fact that many banks predominantly hold sovereign debt issued by their home
country, i.e., Italian banks hold a much higher amount of Italian sovereign bonds than non-Italian
banks. This means that sovereign risk is directly translated into credit risk for domestic financial
institutions, exacerbating the aforementioned sovereign-bank nexus. See, e.g., Gaetano Gaballo
& Ariel Zetlin-Jones, Bailouts, Moral Hazard and Banks’ Home Bias for Sovereign Debt, 81(c)
J. MONETARY ECON. 70 (2016).
12. We do not doubt that drawing a line between a solvency and liquidity crises is
extremely challenging and subject to enormous controversy, particularly in the context of a
sovereign borrower. Yet, the current ambiguity undermines the confidence in and the credibility
of the ESM lending framework. See, e.g., Nouriel Roubini, Debt Sustainability: How to Assess
Whether a Country is Insolvent (Dec. 20, 2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://people.stern.nyu.edu/nroubini/papers/debtsustainability.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4Y3QWKV2]; see also Pablo D’Erasmo, Enrique G. Mendoza & Jing Zhang, What is a Sustainable
Public Debt?, in 2B HANDBOOK OF MACROECONOMICS 2493 (John Taylor & Harold Uhlig eds.,
2015).
13. See, e.g., Vincent Bignon, Marc Flandreau & Stefano Ugolini, Bagehot for Beginners:
The Making of Lender-of-Last-Resort Operations in the Mid-nineteenth Century, 65 ECON.
HIST. R EV. 580 (2012).
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unsustainable. 14 Indeed, as the European Central Bank (“ECB”)
mentioned in its opinion on the ESM Treaty, “[the ESM’s] framework
should be designed in a way that minimises moral hazard and reinforces
incentives for pre-emptive fiscal and macroeconomic adjustment.” 15
Against this backdrop, the present Article seeks to sketch out an
improved European Sovereign Debt Restructuring Framework
(“ESDRF”) 16 without, however, reaching conclusions as regards the
actual feasibility of such framework from an economic or political
point of view. This Article draws upon other proposals by academics17
and policymakers. 18 It incorporates both voices advocating for the
establishment of an ESDRF and such cautioning against it.
One strand of the literature argues that an ESDRF may reinforce
the credibility of the no-bailout clause 19 ex-ante by making sovereign
default a feasible option to remedy unsustainable public debt levels
within the euro area, 20 anchor market participants’ expectations in

14. See DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK, MONTHLY REPORT: APPROACHES TO RESOLVING
SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISES IN THE EURO AREA, 41 (2016), 45.
15. European Central Bank CON/2011/24 (Opinion of the European Central Bank on a
Draft European Council Decision Amending Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union with Regard to a Stability Mechanism for Member States Whose Currency is
the Euro), 2011 O.J. (C 140/05) ¶ 2, available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/
pdf/c_14020110511en00080011.pdf [https://perma.cc/JSR6-CRVM].
16. The term ESDRF, as used in this paper, describes a framework for debt restructuring
rather than an institution or a mechanism with a strong institutional element.
17. See Clemens Fuest, Friedrich `Heinemann & Christoph Schröder, A Viable Insolvency
Procedure for Sovereigns (VIPS) in the Euro Area, ZEW DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 14-053, 1
(2014), available at http://www.zew.de/en/publikationen/a-viable-insolvency-procedure-forsovereigns-vips-in-the-euro-area/?cHash=ec0bea56b1a938f2c45222a996291dcf
[https://perma.cc/WJR9-YHGA]; see also François Gianviti, Anne O. Krueger, Jean PisaniFerry, André Sapir & Jürgen von Hagen, A European Mechanism for Sovereign Debt Crisis
Resolution: A Proposal, X BRUEGEL BLUEPRINT SERIES, 1 (2010), available at
http://bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/imported/publications/101109_BP_as_jpf_jvh_
A_European_mechanism_for_sovereign_debt_crisis_resolution_a_proposal.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9D8Y-QLN5]; COMM . ON INT’ L ECON. P OL. & REFORM , R EVISITING
SOVEREIGN B ANKRUPTCY (Oct. 2013).
18. See Jochen Andritzky, Désirée I. Christofzik, Lars P. Feld & Uwe Scheuering, A
Mechanism to Regulate Sovereign Debt Restructuring in the Euro Area, (German Council of
Economic Experts Working Paper, No 04, July 2016). See also André Sapir & Dirk
Schoenmaker, The Time is Right for a European Monetary Fund, BRUEGEL POLICY BRIEF NO.
4, Oct. 2017, available at http://bruegel.org/2017/10/the-time-is-right-for-a-europeanmonetary-fund/ [https://perma.cc/MC6D-CLFN]; EUR . P ARL. T HINK T ANK, SOVEREIGN
DEBT RESTRUCTURING: MAIN DRIVERS AND MECHANISM (2017).
19. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union art.
125, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 99 [hereinafter TFEU].
20. Andritzky et al., supra note 18, para. 37 at 15.
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sovereign creditworthiness, 21 and facilitate more orderly and equitable
debt restructuring ex-post by introducing a predefined legal procedure
to deter holdout behavior. 22 Another strand focuses on the associated
risks, arguing that if not implemented together with other reforms, an
ESDRF could immediately weaken banks’ balance sheets, thereby
reinforcing the so-called “sovereign-bank feedback loop” 23 as well as
negatively impact the transmission of monetary policy. 24
A recent paper by Gourinchas and Martin takes a middle ground,
arguing that both narratives hold some truths: (official sector) bail-outs
may avoid debt default, but the no-bailout commitment may only be
credibly safeguarded by ensuring orderly government debt
restructurings. 25
The present Article neither advocates that an enhanced debt
restructuring framework provides a panacea nor that the idea should be
dismissed without further investigation. On that basis, it endeavors to
shine light on some of the complex and intricate legal aspects of
sovereign debt restructurings in Europe, which have so far received
little attention. At the same time, it is stressed that any enhancements
to the euro area sovereign debt restructuring framework have to be
decided on a political level by European governments and EU
legislators. 26

21. EUR . P ARL. T HINK T ANK, supra note 18, at 11.
22. Gianviti et al., supra note 17, at 5.
23. See generally Nicola Gennaioli, Alberto Martin & Stefano Rossi, Sovereign Default,
Domestic Banks, and Financial Institutions, 69 J. FIN. 819 (2014). See also Ricardo Hermitte,
Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanisms: Mind the Trap, in SUSTAINABLE GROWTH IN THE
EU (Luigi Paganetto ed., 2017); Lorenzo Forni & Massimimiliano Pisani, Macroeconomic
Effects of Sovereign Restructuring in a Monetary Union: A Model-based Approach, (IMF,
Working Paper WP/13/269, Dec. 2013), available at https://www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp13269.pdf [https://perma.cc/YEJ9-SWXY].
24. Note for instance that the debt restructuring may negatively affect the eligibility of
bonds for monetary policy operations. See, e.g., European Central Bank, Decision on the
Eligibility of Marketable Debt Instruments Issued or Fully Guaranteed by the Hellenic Republic
in the Context of the Hellenic Republic’s Debt Exchange Offer, 2012 O.J. L 77 (Mar. 5, 2012)
at 19.
25. See Pierre Olivier Gourinchas & Philippe Martin, The Economics of Sovereign Debt,
Bailouts and the Eurozone Crisis, (May 19, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), available at
https://cepr.org/sites/default/files/1884_MARTIN%20%20The%20Economics%20of%20Sovereign%20Debt,%20Bailouts%20and%20the%20Euroz
one%20Crisis.pdf [https://perma.cc/RKC4-AFBA].
26. Indeed, depending on the legal basis that is chosen, an ESDRF may require a qualified
majority among Member States, if not unanimity See infra III.C. for a discussion of the ESDRF’s
legal basis.
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The Article is structured as follows: Section II reviews the euro
area’s sovereign debt crisis resolution mechanism de lege lata with a
view to providing an understanding of the existing framework. Section
III discusses—de lege ferenda—how the legal framework for
restructuring of sovereign debt in the euro area could be enhanced. It
discusses, in particular, existing proposals to enhance sovereign debt
restructurings, the ESDRF’s potential legal basis, as well as
institutional, procedural, and substantive aspects that ought to be taken
into account. Section IV concludes.
II. THE EURO AREA’S CURRENT SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS
MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK
“[ . . . ] the effectiveness and potential costs of debt
restructuring depend not only on their economic
impact but also on the legal framework.”
- Bénassy-Quéré et al., Group of 14 French-German
Economists, January 2018. 27
A. The Greek Sovereign Debt Restructuring of 2012
The start of the recent euro area debt crisis can be traced back to
2009 when the newly elected Greek Prime Minister publicly
announced that the country’s budget deficit will likely hit twelve
percent of Gross Domestic Product (“GDP”) in 2010. 28 Markets
reacted to this bleak fiscal outlook by increasing the risk premia Greece
had to pay on its sovereign bonds. 29 In the following two years, several
financial assistance programs were agreed with European and
international partners to stabilize the Greek economy. Ultimately,
however, deep debt relief proved inevitable and the so-called “Troika,”
consisting of the IMF, the ECB, and the European Commission, made
further financial assistance dependent upon the implementation of a

27. Agnès Bénassy-Quéré et al., Reconciling Risk Sharing with Market Discipline: A
Constructive Approach to Euro Area Reform, CEPR POLICY INSIGHTS NO. 91, Jan. 2018, at 12,
available at https://cepr.org/active/publications/policy_insights/viewpi.php?pino=91 [https://
perma.cc/5EYZ-Y89D].
28. This led to an upward revision of the deficit projection by Eurostat from 3.7% to
12.5%. Cf. Provision of Deficit and Debt Data for 2008 – Second Notification, EUROSTAT NEWS
(Oct. 22, 2009), http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/5074630/2-22102009-AP-EN.
PDF/490aa296-ccc7-4714-91c5-b5c8ddb73948?version=1.0 [https://perma.cc/MJZ2-MK9Y].
29. See Lane, supra note 2, at 56-57.
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nominal haircut on Greek government debt. 30 The Greek Private Sector
Involvement (“PSI”) of 2012 was not only the biggest debt
restructuring operation in history, it was also the first one to take place
in an advanced economy. 31 As the zero-risk weighting rule of euro area
public debt, defined under the applicable EU Regulations, suggests, 32
sovereign default in an advanced European country was long
considered impossible; indeed, some policymakers referred to a Greek
default as “death penalty.” 33
In March 2012, Greece successfully imposed a haircut on private
bondholders by retrofitting collective action clauses (“CACs”) to
Greek-law bonds, as mandated in the conditions of the Second
Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece. 34 The debt relief, which
resulted in creditor losses of more than fifty percent on average,
reduced Greece’s debt burden by roughly EU€100 billion. 35 From a
legal point of view, debt relief was achieved by means of the Greek
Bondholder Act (“GBA”) 2012, which enabled a majority of sixty-six
percent or two-thirds of bondholders to bind a minority of holdouts to
the terms and conditions of the debt swap agreed upon with the

30. The Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece, 6 EUR. COMM.
OCCASIONAL PAPERS 94, March 2012, at 6, available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_
finance/publications/occasional_paper/2012/pdf/ocp94_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/S74P-KYBQ].
31. See Michael Tomz and Mark L.J. Wright, Empirical Research on Sovereign Debt and
Default, 5 AN. REV. ECON. 247, 257 (2013) (noting that “[t]he largest default in history (by
present value) was the 2012 Greek restructuring that covered more than €200 billion of privately
held debt, followed by Argentina in 2001 and Russia in 1918.”).
32. Regulation 575/13 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on
Prudential Requirements for Credit Institutions and Investment Firms and Amending Regulation
648/12, 2012 O.J. (L 201) 1. For a recent criticism of this zero-risk weighting rule for euro area
sovereign bonds, see e.g., Andreas Dombret, Executive Board Member, Deutsche Bundesbank,
Speech at the Annual Conference on the Banking Union: The Other Side of the Coin – Why
European Supervision Needs International Regulation (May 15, 2017), available at
https://www.bis.org/review/r170515a.htm [https://perma.cc/FWX2-2K72].
33. Ralph Atkins, Interview Transcript: Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, FIN. TIMES (May 29,
2011), https://www.ft.com/content/91f52140-89e2-11e0-beff-00144feab49a [https://perma.cc/
57NT-YJH2].
34. The Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece, supra note 30. See, e.g.,
Sebastian Grund, Restructuring Government Debt Under Local Law: The Greek Case and
Implications for Investor Protection in Europe, 12 CAP. M KTS. L. J. 253 (2017); Jeromin
Zettelmeyer, Christoph Trebesch & Mitu Gulati, The Greek Debt Restructuring: an Autopsy, 28
ECON. POL’Y 513 (2013).
35. Miranda Xava, Lessons From the 2012 Greek Debt Restructuring, VOXEU, (Jun. 25,
2014), http://voxeu.org/article/greek-debt-restructuring-lessons-learned [https://perma.cc/
3KM8-VTDE].
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Troika. 36 While this mechanism worked smoothly for Greek-law
bonds, holdouts blocked the restructuring of EU€6 billion in foreignlaw bonds. 37 The latter type of bonds featured single-limb nonaggregated CACs, which, in contrast to the aggregated version
implemented through the GBA, required a majority of seventy-five
percent in each individual series of bonds. 38
Fearing protracted litigation in foreign courts and weary of
reputational risks, the Greek government paid these holdout funds in
full, openly discriminating between holders of foreign and Greek-law
bonds. Moreover, and this is a lesser-known fact, the Greek debt
exchange offer included a minimum participation threshold, which
stipulated that if 90% of bondholders agreed to Greece’s restructuring,
it would be deemed successful. 39 While holders of foreign-law bonds
thus escaped a haircut, several thousands of holders of Greek-law that
were exposed to losses challenged Greece in foreign and domestic
courts. Remarkably, litigation in respect of domestic-law bonds is still
ongoing roughly six years after the debt operation was concluded. 40 It
is now widely agreed that the first and only debt restructuring in the
euro area revealed significant inefficiencies in the euro area’s crisis
resolution framework, prompting a set of reforms aimed at making the
currency area more resilient to future sovereign debt distress. 41

36. Notably, the retrofitted CAC was fully aggregated, which means that bondholders
voted not in each individual series but their votes were aggregated across the entire outstanding
stock of Greek debt. See Press Release, Hellenic Republic Ministry of Finance, (March 9, 2012),
available at http://www.pdma.gr/attachments/article/80/9%20MARCH%202012%20-%20
RESULTS.pdf [https://perma.cc/TEB8-NJ6R].
37. Lee Buchheit, The Greek Debt Restructuring of 2012, in ESCB LEGAL CONFERENCE
(Oct. 2016), at 46, available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/escblegalconference
2016_201702.en.pdf?e2dea3a78485afe4c70d5d5010f368be [https://perma.cc/2NBZ-E4NT].
38. Hence, holdouts may acquire blocking positions in smaller series, thereby thwarting
the entire debt swap. See, e.g., Anna Gelpern, Ben Heller & Brad Setser, Count the Limbs:
Designing Robust Aggregation Clauses in Sovereign Bonds, GEO L. FAC. PUBLICATIONS &
OTHER WORKS 1793 (2015).
39. “Minimum participation thresholds” condition the exchange to a critical level of
creditor participation, meaning that a debt restructuring will not be successful if a certain
percentage of bondholders does not take part in the deal. They have to be differentiated from
CACs, however. CACs enable ensure financial democracy, while minimum participation
thresholds are coordinating devices. See, e.g., Ran Bi, Marcos Chamon, and Jeromin
Zettelmeyer, The Problem that Wasn’t: Coordination Failures in Sovereign Debt
Restructurings, 64 INT’L. MON. FUND ECON. REV. 471 (2016).
40. See, e.g., Grund, supra note 34 (reviewing litigation with regard to domestic law bonds
after the Greek PSI in different municipal courts across Europe).
41. Bénassy-Quéré et al., supra note 27.
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B. The European Stability Mechanism
The ESM is at the core of the euro area sovereign debt crisis
management framework. The ESM is an international organization in
2012 in the wake of the euro area debt crisis. The ESM has the objective
to “mobilize funding and provide stability support under strict
conditionality, appropriate to the financial assistance instrument
chosen, to the benefit of ESM Members which are experiencing, or are
threatened by, severe financing problems, if indispensable to safeguard
the financial stability of the euro area as a whole and of its Member
States.” 42 Given that the ESDRF proposal advanced in this Article
foresees a central role for the ESM, this Section briefly outlines the
ESM’s tasks and its functioning, with a particular focus on its role in
debt restructurings.
1. Features and functions
The ESM is an international body that lends to euro area
governments that have lost access to international credit markets. 43 It
is based on an international treaty that operates outside EU law, but it
is still connected to the EU legal framework. 44 For instance, the Court
of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) has limited jurisdiction
over the interpretation of the ESM Treaty. 45 The original EMU
governance framework did not envisage any permanent mechanism for
financial assistance to euro area Member States experiencing or
threatened by financial difficulties. 46 Given the fear of contagion
sparked by the euro area sovereign debt crisis, policymakers saw no
alternative to devising a mechanism that provides temporary liquidity
42. Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism art. 3, Feb. 2, 2012, [hereinafter
ESM Treaty].
43. See, e.g., Ledina Gocaj & Sophie Meunier, Time Will Tell: The EFSF, the ESM, and
the Euro Crisis, 35 J. EUR. INTEGRATION 239 (2013).
44. This connection inter alia stems from the fact that the ESM Treaty has to respect EU
law, as for instance clarified in the Pringle case. See Case C-370/12, Pringle v. Government of
Ireland, 2012 E.C.R. 756, ¶ 178.
45. See ESM Treaty, supra note 42, art. 37. To finance its operations, the ESM taps capital
markets and thereby leverages the capital paid in by ESM Member States, which allows it to
obtain a very favorable credit rating that can be translated into cheap financing for countries in
distress, see EUR . STABILITY M ECHANISM , ANNUAL R EPORT 2015 (2016).
46. See TFEU, supra note 19, art. 125, which entails the no-bailout clause. For a discussion
of the no-bailout clause, see, e.g., Jean-Victor Louis, Guest Editorial: The No-Bailout Clause
and Rescue Packages, 47 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 971, 978 (2010) (noting that “[t]he no-bailout
clause is an essential part of the’budgetary code’ of the Union, and beyond its literal wording
is . . . the expression of the responsibility of each Member State for its own public finance. . . .”).
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assistance to Member States with the aim of safeguarding financial
stability in the euro area as a whole. 47
In essence, the ESM lends to states that have lost market access,
providing liquidity for below-market rates during periods of financial
stress. 48 In this sense, the ESM assumes the role of an international
lender of last resort to euro area sovereigns, 49 whereby the ESM’s
claims rank above those of private creditors and only below those of
the IMF. 50 The flipside of receiving money from other euro area
Member States when regular access to markets is impaired is the
macroeconomic conditionality attached to the ESM’s lending
programs, which—to a large extent—mimics the IMF’s long-standing
practice of demanding meaningful macroeconomic adjustment in
exchange for emergency loans. 51
At the same time, the ESM entails a very rudimentary legal
framework for debt restructuring. The only reference to debt
restructuring is in Recital (12) of the ESM Treaty and reads as follows:
“[i]n accordance with IMF practice, in exceptional cases an adequate
and proportionate form of private sector involvement shall be
considered in cases where stability support is provided accompanied
by conditionality in the form of a macro-economic adjustment
programs.” 52
While this provision reflects a compromise between euro area
governments not to ex-ante rule out the restructuring of bonds to restore
47. See, e.g., ESM Treaty, supra note 42, recital (6) (stating that “[t]he ESM may therefore
provide stability support on the basis of a strict conditionality, appropriate to the financial
assistance instrument chosen if indispensable to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area
as a whole and of its Member States.”).
48. For a discussion of the ESM and previous crisis management mechanisms for the euro
area, see, e.g., Matthias Ruffert, The European Debt Crisis and European Union Law, 48
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1777 (2011).
49. While the term “lender of last resort” is often associated with the ECB’s function of
providing liquidity to banks if market funding dries up, it is also used in the context of the IMF
or the ESM, whose role it is to replace market funding for sovereigns in crisis.
50. See, e.g., Klaus Regling, ESM Managing Director, The Next Steps to Make the Euro
Area More Resilient (Feb. 16, 2016), available at https://www.esm.europa.eu/sites/default/
files/2017_02_16_kr_speech_munich.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MZF-9WUM].
51. For an overview of the IMF’s lending practices, see Olivier Jeanne, Jonathan D. Ostry
& Jeromin Zettelmeyer, A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality (IMF,
Working Paper No. WP/08/236, 2008), available at https://www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/wp/2008/wp08236.pdf [https://perma.cc/WXW8-XARZ]. So far, ESM loans have been
provided to Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Cyprus, and Greece, with Greece remaining the only
country which has not yet exited its ESM financial assistance program.
52. ESM Treaty, supra note 42, recital (12).
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debt sustainability, it may cause more confusion than clarification.
First, neither the ESM Treaty nor publicly accessible policy documents
describe what applying the IMF’s practice would mean in the context
of an ESM program 53 or suggest that the ESM would follow the IMF’s
approach to debt restructuring. Second, it is easy to conceive the kind
of legal, political, and practical problems that arise when the ESM is to
ascertain whether or not a debt crisis is indeed “exceptional.” Third, the
level of adequacy and proportionality of debt restructuring measures is
likely to remain subject to an ex-post interpretation by national courts,
which have a very mixed track record in supporting the orderly
resolution of sovereign debt. 54
In this regard, it should be noted that the first version of the ESM
Treaty, which was signed on July 11, 2011 by seventeen Member
States, but never entered into force, entailed much more specific
language as regard debt sustainability assessment and private sector
involvement. 55 The first version of the ESM Treaty thus suggests that
53. For instance, it is not clear whether this provision refers to IMF practice at the time of
the drafting of the ESM Treaty (i.e. 2011) or whether the provision is to be interpreted
dynamically. This question is particularly important given that the IMF has already adjusted its
Exceptional Access policy since 2011.
54. See, e.g., for recent developments in U.S. jurisprudence in the realm of sovereign debt
restructuring in Juan J. Cruces & Tim R. Samples, Settling Sovereign Debt’s ‘Trial of the
Century’, 31 EMORY L. REV. 5 (2016); Joseph Cotterill, Choose Your Own Adventure,
Sovereign Debt Trial of the Century Edition, FIN. TIMES A LPHAVILLE (Feb. 8, 2013),
https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2013/02/08/1379162/choose-your-own-adventure-sovereign-debttrial-of-the-century-edition/ [https://perma.cc/95LB-RW89]; Jesse Kaplan, Collective Action
and the Competence of Courts: The Lessons of NML v. Argentina, 20 STAN . J. L. B US. & FIN .
1 (2014). It is also mentioned, however, that US courts have recently reversed course after the
Argentine government settled with the holdouts. For an overview of the debate, see, e.g., Lee
Buchheit & Andrés de la Cruz, Pari Passu Reinterpreted, INT. FIN. L. REV. (2018),
http://www.iflr.com/Article/3783277/Pari-passu-reinterpreted.html
[https://perma.cc/ZLL5YYZV].
55. See Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, July 11, 2011, available
at https://www.cvce.eu/obj/treaty_establishing_the_european_stability_mechanism_11_july_
2011-en-cb18477d-69e4-4645-81a9-3070e02d245a.html
[https://perma.cc/MAT7-AFKS].
Note that this Treaty was not ratified by Member States and thus never entered into force. The
relevant provision about debt restructuring reads as follows:
An adequate and proportionate form of private-sector involvement shall be sought on
a case-by-case basis where financial assistance is received by an ESM Member, in
line with IMF practice. The nature and the extent of this involvement shall depend on
the outcome of a debt sustainability analysis and shall take due account of the risk of
contagion and potential spill-over effects on other Member States of the European
Union and third countries. If, on the basis of this analysis, it is concluded that a macroeconomic adjustment programme can realistically restore public debt to a sustainable
path, the beneficiary ESM Member shall take initiatives aimed at encouraging the
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the lack of clarity in the current Recital (12) of the ESM Treaty was not
the result of an accidental omission. Rather, it is likely to have reflected
a political compromise between those pushing for more ex-ante rules
and those advocating ex-post discretion.
For the purpose of this Article, the first draft of the ESM Treaty
holds important lessons and truths both legally and politically. First, it
circumscribes the outer boundaries of legal language that was
acceptable to Member States, at least for the period between July 2011,
when the first version of the ESM Treaty was signed, and February
2012, when the current version of the ESM Treaty was signed. Linking
the granting of ESM financial assistance to the Member State’s
commitment to ensure PSI seems not to have raised any constitutional
law issues in Member States, given that the Heads of State signed this
first version of the Treaty. 56 Second, Member States were ready to
clarify the ESM’s approach to situations of questionable solvency, i.e.,
if the debt sustainability analysis (“DSA”) yields a negative result.57
The proposed framework, as discussed further below, essentially
reflects the IMF’s access policy and, in part, goes even beyond it. 58
2. Reconciling the no-bailout clause with official-sector financial
assistance: The Pringle case
The ESM’s legality under EU law, particularly with respect to the
no-bailout clause and Article 125 of the Treaty of the Functioning of
main private investors to maintain their exposure. Where it is concluded that a macroeconomic adjustment programme cannot realistically restore the public debt to a
sustainable path, the beneficiary ESM Member shall be required to engage in active
negotiations in good faith with its non-official creditors to secure their direct
involvement in restoring debt sustainability. In the latter case, the granting of financial
assistance will be contingent on the ESM Member having a credible plan for restoring
debt sustainability and demonstrating sufficient commitment to ensure adequate and
proportionate private-sector involvement. Progress in the implementation of the plan
will be monitored under the programme and will be taken into account in the decisions
on disbursements.
56. See id. For further discussion, see also infra III.D.1.
57. See, e.g., CINZIA ALDICI AND DANIEL GROS, DEBT SUSTAINABILITY ASSESSMENTS:
THE STATE OF THE ART 17 (2018), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
RegData/etudes/IDAN/2018/624426/IPOL_IDA(2018)624426_EN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MR2P-UG57] (stating that “[a]ny decision to grant financial assistance to a
country (or rather its government) must be preceded by an analysis of the sustainability of public
finances”).
58. Id. (discussing the IMF’s framework for situations of questionable solvency of a
requesting Member).
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the EU (“TFEU”), has been questioned from the very first days of its
mentioning in official policy papers. 59 At the time of negotiating the
Maastricht Treaty, EU governments were reluctant to cede
competences in monetary and economic policy to the European Union,
thus deliberately fostering an asymmetric framework for EMU. 60
Monetary policy tasks were transferred to the ECB and the European
System of Central Banks (“ESCB”), while the role of the European
Union in economic policy was limited to the adoption of coordinating
measures. 61 In the context of the ESM’s establishment, the CJEU
addressed the question of whether the establishment of the ESM
transgressed the boundaries set out by EU law in its f amous Pringle
case. 62 The CJEU held, on the one hand, that the amended Article
136(3) TFEU did not create a new (economic policy) competence for
the Union, and, on the other hand, that the ESM was compatible with
the no-bailout clause under Article 125 TFEU. 63
More specifically, the CJEU found that “Article 125 TFEU does
not prohibit the granting of financial assistance by one or more Member
States to a Member State which remains responsible for its
commitments to its creditors provided that the conditions attached to
such assistance are such as to prompt that Member State to implement
a sound budgetary policy.” 64
Strict ESM conditionality, designed to foster sound budgetary
policy, and the fact that the recipient Member State remained liable to
repay the sums lent, convinced more critical voices in the CJEU that
the ESM was not a backdoor to permanent fiscal transfers within the
euro area. 65 Regarding the issue of debt restructuring, the Pringle
decision is silent. This said, one could infer from the CJEU’s
conclusions that the restructuring of sovereign bonds issued by the

59. See, e.g., Communication from the European Commission and the Council and the
Economic and Financial Committee on the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism,
COM(2010) 713 final, (Nov. 30, 2011)..
60. See generally Paul de Grauwe & Marc-Alexandré Sénégas, Asymmetries in the
Monetary Policy Transmission: Some Implications for EMU and its Enlargement, 42 J.
COMMON MKT. STUD. 757 (2004).
61. Chris Koedooder, The Pringle Judgment: Economic and/or Monetary Union?, 37
FORDHAM INT’ L L. J. 111 (2013).
62. Case C-370/12, Pringle v. Government of Ireland, 2012 E.C.R. 756.
63. Id. at ¶¶ 129-47.
64. Id. at ¶¶ 138-41.
65. Id.
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recipient country does not run counter to EU law.66 Indeed, the right to
restructure public debt is generally deemed to be in the sovereign’s
discretion, albeit important limitations may result when combined with
a financial assistance program. 67
3. The Euro Area Model CAC (Euro CAC)
The ESM Treaty also introduced a new system for PSI in the
EMU, mandating the inclusion of CACs in all euro area government
bonds issued after July 1, 2013 (“Euro CAC”). 68 The Euro CAC
essentially enables a majority of bondholders to approve a restructuring
plan proposed by the government instead of requiring unanimous
agreement with the debt workout. 69 Their purpose is two-fold: first, the
obligation on euro area Member States to use CACs would alleviate
holdout problems in future restructuring and second, with the inclusion
of CACs, ESM signatories could consider debt restructuring a feasible
policy option to remedy deep debt crises in exceptional cases. 70

66. Indeed, the Troika required the Greek government to implement a debt restructuring
in order to be eligible for additional financial assistance in early 2012; see The Second Economic
Adjustment Programme for Greece, supra note 30.
67. See, e.g., Vassilis Paliouras, The Right to Restructure Sovereign Debt, 20 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 115 (2017).
68. ESM Treaty, supra note 42, art. 12(3).
69. See Econ. & Fin. Comm., Sub-Comm. on EU Sovereign Debt Mkts., Common
Terms of Reference of the Euro area model CAC, EUROPA (Feb. 17, 2012),
https://europa.eu/efc/sites/efc/files/docs/pages/cac_-_text_model_cac.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K48X-NELK] [hereinafter ESDM]. In addition, to alleviate certain conflicts
of interest, the Euro CAC also includes disenfranchisement clauses, which excludes government
bonds held by the issuer or by any of its ministries, departments or agencies from the CAC
voting procedure. As stated in the Explanatory Note accompanying the Euro CAC,
‘disenfranchising an issuer’s holdings of its own bonds is appropriate because the losses suffered
by the issuer from the modification of the bonds it holds, unlike the losses suffered by an
ordinary market participant, are more than offset by the gains realized by the issuer from the
resulting reduction in its debt service or debt stock or both.’ See ESDM, Collective Action
Clause
–
Explanatory
Note,
EUROPA
(July
26,
2011),
https://europa.eu/efc/sites/efc/files/docs/pages/explanatory_note_draft_on_the_model_cac__26_july.pdf [https://perma.cc/U683-7S3C].
70. In our view, this is the only sensible way of interpreting the euro area governments’
decision to move to CACs. Before the euro area crisis, CACs were exclusively considered in the
context of foreign law government bond issues in Europe; see, e.g., Implementation of the EU
Commitment on Collective Action Clauses in Documentation of International Debt Issuance
(Econ. & Fin. Comm., ECFIN/CEFCPE(2004)REP/50483 final), Nov. 12, 2004, available at
https://europa.eu/efc/sites/efc/files/docs/pages/cacs_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TJH7-L29U]
(concerning the implementation of CACs for active issuers in the EU who issued debt under a
foreign jurisdiction). For a discussion of the rationale of inserting CACs in domestic law-
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With the introduction of Euro CACs, the legal technique
employed in the Greek PSI of 2012, 71 i.e., to retrofit CACs to domestic
law bonds in order to facilitate a ‘voluntary’ debt restructuring, will no
longer be necessary. The introduction of Euro CACs will considerably
enhance legal certainty for investors in the event of another debt crisis.
Indeed, recent studies suggest that investors value the fact that states
are—to some extent—bound to a predefined procedure for PSI. 72 By
making the inclusion of Euro CACs mandatory under the ESM Treaty,
investors can now expect that states will restructure their debts in line
with the statutory voting threshold rather than any other arbitrary,
perhaps more expedient, procedure for the state in distress. 73
However, while the Euro CACs are the single most useful
contractual tool to provide for more orderly and fair debt restructurings,
they are no panacea. 74 For instance, holdout investors may still acquire
a blocking position given that Euro CACs require an affirmative vote
of at least sixty-six percent or two-thirds of bondholders in each
individual series and that holdouts may act in concert. 75 In this respect,
Euro CACs differ from the international standard for sovereign bonds
issued in foreign capital markets, which only requires one vote for all
series and an affirmative vote of seventy-five percent of bondholders. 76
governed debt securities, see, e.g., Michael Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Collective Action Clauses
for the Eurozone, 18 REV. FIN. 2045 (2013).
71. See supra II.A. for an overview of the Greek PSI.
72. See, e.g., Antonio Guglielmi, Javier Suarez & Carlo Signani, Country Update, Italy:
Re-denomination Risk Down as Time Goes By, MEDIOBANCA SECURITIES COUNTRY UPDATE,
(Jan. 19, 2017), http://marcello.minenna.it/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Italy-2017-01-19.pdf.
73. See, e.g., Grund, supra note 34.
74. In the pertinent literature, it is widely acknowledged that CACs are insufficient to
address inefficiencies in the restructuring process other than the holdout problem. See, e.g., Anna
Gelpern, Sovereign Debt: Now What?, 41 YALE J. INT’ L L. 45, 91 (2016); Ben Emons,
Collective Action Clauses: No Panacea for Sovereign Debt Restructurings, PIMCO VIEWPOINT
(Oct. 2012), https://www.pimco.com/en-us/insights/viewpoints/viewpoints/collective-actionclauses-no-panacea-for-sovereign-debt-restructurings [https://perma.cc/9SPK-X898].
75. In this respect, the Euro CACs differ from the ICMA, which requires a (super) majority
of seventy-five percent of bondholders to consent to a contractual modification suggested by the
sovereign. The purpose of the so-called “aggregation feature” is to mitigate holdout behavior
more effectively. For a comparison of the two different types of CACs, see, e.g., IMF,
Strengthening the Contractual Framework to Address Collective Action Problems in Sovereign
Debt Restructuring, IMF Policy Paper (Oct. 2014), at 19-20, available at
https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2014/090214.pdf [https://perma.cc/366X-C4U8]. Also
see infra III.F.1. for a discussion as to why the Euro CAC should be aligned to the international
standard.
76. For the international standard for English and New York law sovereign bonds, see
INTERNATIONAL C APITAL M ARKETS A SSOCIATION, S TANDARD COLLECTIVE ACTION
AND PARI PASSU C LAUSES FOR THE TERMS AND C ONDITIONS OF SOVEREIGN NOTES (Aug.
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Not surprisingly, the CAC retrofitted to Greek-law bonds contained full
aggregation feature, which meant that they deviated from the standard
European governments had agreed upon just months before. 77 This was
deemed vital for the success of the Greek debt restructuring operation.
Against this backdrop, we propose some amendments to the Euro
CACs as explained below. 78
III. A EUROPEAN SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING
FRAMEWORK (“ESDRF”)
“While the creation of the IMF’s SDRM was rejected
on the grounds that it would interfere with national
sovereignty, this objection is much less valid at
European level where states have agreed to share
sovereignty within the framework of the EU’s
community of law.”
- Gianviti et al., Bruegel, November 2010. 79
A.

Introduction

Throughout the past decade, a number of authors have argued that
EMU governance still does not contain the requisite tools to remedy
2014),
available
at
https://www.icmagroup.org/Regulatory-Policy-and-MarketPractice/Primary-Markets/primary-market-topics/collective-action-clauses/
[https://perma.cc/9ZC7-ZDMJ] [hereinafter ICMA]. The ICMA CAC has been perceived
relatively positively by the market and approximately 89% of the New York law governed bonds
included enhanced CACs, compared with approximately 80% of newly issued English law
bonds. See IMF, Second Progress Report on Inclusion of Enhanced Contractual Provisions
in International Sovereign Bond Contracts (Jan. 2017), available at https://www.imf.org/
external/np/pp/eng/2017/122716.pdf [https://perma.cc/T63Q-ZQPG]. The Euro CAC does have
a limited aggregation feature, which however does not resolve the holdout problem; see infra
III.F.1.
77. See supra II.A. It became evident that holdout inefficiencies pose real problems to debt
restructuring when, during the Greek PSI, several hedge funds thwarted the restructuring of 17
series of English-law bonds by acquiring minority blocking positions. See Zettelmeyer et al.,
supra note 34, 538, which noted:
[u]nlike the English-law bonds, this threshold applied across bonds rather than just
bond-by-bond, subject only to a participation quorum of at least 50% of face value.
In the end, this aggregation feature turned out to be pivotal for the results of the debt
exchange, as it allowed the restructuring of 100% of the Greek law sovereign bonds,
which themselves made up over 86% of the bonds covered by the restructuring.
78. See infra III.F.1.
79. Gianviti et al., supra note 17, at 21.
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the sovereign debt problem in Member States. 80 Against the backdrop
of existing proposals, as well as the authors’ own analysis, the
subsequent sections seek to explain how a better debt restructuring
framework could be designed, focusing, in particular, on its legal
features and functions. 81 For the sake of clarity, it is noted that the term
“ESDRF” is neither equivalent to the ESM nor a potential European
Monetary Fund (“EMF”). 82 Rather, the ESDRF should be understood
as an umbrella term that consists of a set of rules with the shared
objective of rendering debt restructurings more orderly, transparent,
and fair. 83 Moreover, it is emphasized that the ESDRF would not
“force” countries into debt restructurings, 84 but rather clarify the
mechanics of crisis lending when debt is unsustainable. Whether or not
debt should be restructured remains, at all times, a sovereign decision.85
B. Existing Proposals
Most of the existing proposals for a debt restructuring mechanism
in the euro area have discussed the potential (economic) benefits of a
statutory solution to debt restructuring in the euro area. 86 At the center
80. Charles Wyplosz, The Six Flaws of the Eurozone, 31 ECON. P OL. 559 (2016). For a
recent analysis of the status of sovereign debt restructuring in the euro area from a legal
perspective, see, e.g., Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt Restructuring in
Europe, 9 GLOBAL P OL. 65 (2018).
81. A review of the pertinent literature revealed a paucity of in-depth analyses of the legal
framework that may underpin such mechanism. Here, this Article aims at making a serious
contribution to scholarship that should serve as a starting point for future work and research.
82. The EMF has been proposed as an enhanced ESM anchored in Union law by the
European Commission in December 2017; see infra III.C.3. for an overview of the proposal.
83. In the given context, an orderly debt restructuring is one where holdouts’ interference
is reduced and a fair debt restructuring is one where the burden of adjustment is appropriately
shared between the private and public sector.
84. As the ECB held in 2012 in the context of the Greek PSI, “it remains the sole
responsibility of the Government of the Hellenic Republic to take the necessary action that will
ultimately ensure its debt sustainability.” See European Central Bank, Opinion Of The European
Central Bank of 17 February 2012 on the Terms of Securities Issued or Guaranteed by the Greek
State, CON/2012/12 (2012), available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_
2012_12_f_sign.pdf [https://perma.cc/V5J2-LEEG].
85. Paliouras, supra note 67.
86. Andritzky et al., supra note 18, at 6-10; see also Table 1 for an overview. The debate
is closely linked to the establishment of the EMF. See, e.g., Marcel Fratzscher, Why a FrancoGerman Bargain Will Help Secure the Euro, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2017),
https://www.ft.com/content/3a0a4406-7d0b-11e7-ab01-a13271d1ee9c
[https://perma.cc/
UK4S-VRF3]. Compare Daniel Gros & Thomas Mayer, How to deal with sovereign default in
Europe: Create the European Monetary Fund now!, CEPS POLICY BRIEF No. 202 (May 17,
2010) with Laurence Boone & Shahin Vallée, Europe Needs True Fiscal Integration, Not Its
Own IMF, THE ECONOMIST, (May 9, 2017).
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of all proposals for an ESDRF lies the objective of restoring
sustainability of public debt levels and, in doing so, ensuring a fair level
of burden-sharing between private creditors and the sovereign debtor.87
A more transparent and efficient framework for debt restructuring in
the euro area, so the general argument goes, may considerably enhance
the ESM’s effectiveness, as the need for ESM liquidity, i.e., bailouts,
will likely be lower. As Table 1 illustrates, different designs for an
ESDRF have been discussed.
The majority of proposed frameworks entail a pre-positioned
crisis resolution mechanism for sovereign default. Most proposals seek
to combine ex-ante market discipline with an ex-post procedure to deal
with holdout creditors. With regard to the legal basis, it appears that the
majority of commentators prefer the intergovernmental over the EU
approach, which means that the enhanced debt restructuring framework
would be governed by the ESM Treaty. 88 Agreement also seems to
exist in respect of the need to enhance the current design of CACs,
which entails a two-limb voting procedure that is more prone to holdout
strategies. 89
Table 1: Overview of ESDRF Proposals
Proposal

ECRM
European
Crisis
Resolution
Mechanism
(Gianviti et
al., 2010)

Legal
basis

EU
Treaties

Dispute
settlement
process

Interim
financing

• Specialized
chamber at the
CJEU to
initiate and
supervise
negotiations
• No further
details on the
set-up

• European
Financial
Stability Facility
as a permanent
institution
(which is part of
today’s ESM)
• ESM financial
assistance

Restructuring
process
• Debtor
country
launches
negotiations
• Moratorium
of payments
and stay on
litigation

87. At least since the proposal of fourteen top French and German economists, who can
also be considered relatively independent, the accusation that sovereign debt restructuring is an
idea pushed by Germans to impose their ordoliberalist way of thinking to punish countries for
expansionary fiscal policies does not hold anymore. See Bénassy-Quéré et al., supra note 27.
88. See infra III.C.2. for a discussion of the potential legal basis of an ESDRF.
89. See infra III.F.1. for ways to improve the resilience of CACs used in the euro area.
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(linked to
conditionality)

EMF
European
Monetary
Fund
(Mayer/Gros,
2010)

ESDRF
European
Sovereign
Debt
Restructuring
Framework
(Bagchi,
2013)

ESDRR
European
Sovereign
Debt
Restructuring
Regime
(Committee
on

• No further
details on
haircut size etc.

• Provided by
the EMF (similar
to the ESM)

• Liquidity
measures in a
first step
• Restructuring
of debt in a
second step to a
level of sixty
percent of GDP
(akin to a
Brady deal)

• Arbitration
under the
auspices of an
independent
European
Sovereign
Debt
Restructuring
Council
• Procedure
guided by
UNIDROIT
Principles of
Transnational
Civil
Procedure

• Not specified

• ESDRF is
activated after
debt is deemed
unsustainable
by the ESM
• Dispute
settlement body
oversees
ESDRF
proceedings
and related
matters
• Moratorium
on creditor
payments and
immunity from
creditor
enforcement

• Not specified

• ESM lending
conditional upon
debt
restructuring
• Seniority of
liquidity
provision

• Aggregated
majority voting
• ESM funds
immunized
from holdout
litigation
• Restructuring
with the aim of

EU
Treaties

• Not specified

ESM
Treaty

ESM
Treaty
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International
Economic
Policy
Reform,
2013)
VIPS
Viable
Insolvency
Procedure for
Sovereigns
(Fuest et al.,
2015)
MRSDR
Mechanism
to Regulate
Sovereign
Debt
Restructuring
(German
Council of
Economic
Experts,
2016)

[Vol. 42:3
decreasing debt
to 90% of GDP
(liquidity crisis)
or 60% of GDP
(insolvency)

ESM
Treaty

ESM
Treaty

• Not specified

• Not specified

• ESM provides
shelter loans for
three-year period
• Seniority of
liquidity
provision

• Trigger based
on the DSA
• Restructuring
not below sixty
percent debt-toGDP ratio
• Aggregated
majority voting

• ESM financing
includes
maturity
extension

• DSA-based
trigger
• Debt
restructuring
only as a
second step if
maturity
extension
insufficient
• Aggregated
majority voting

C. Legal Basis
This Section analyzes the legal basis of an ESDRF. Given that an
enhanced framework for debt restructurings is inextricably bound to
the ESM’s function as a crisis resolution mechanism, two legal bases
may be envisaged: EU law or international law (ESM Treaty). 90

90. The European Commission noted in its Reflection Paper of summer 2017 that several
methods for strengthening EMU’s legal framework are possible, including by way of the EU
Treaties and the EU institutions, an intergovernmental approach, or a mixture of both as is
already the case today. See Reflection Paper on the Deepening of the Economic and Monetary
Union, Eur. Comm. (May 31, 2017), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/
reflection-paper-emu_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/X66A-R5JX].
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1. EU law
As Ioannidis points out, “[i]n the field of debt, neither creditors
nor Member States should expect solidarity.” 91 Indeed, the current
Treaty framework is centered around a market-based paradigm, which
subjects euro area Member States to market forces by constraining
central bank intervention (Article 123(1) TFEU) 92 or inter-country
financial assistance (Article 125(1) TFEU). 93 From a primary law point
of view, the main question when it comes to government debt
restructuring within the euro area is whether the economic constitution
prohibits, allows or even encourages it.
In this regard, one ought to consider that the no-bailout clause
limits official financial assistance and that the framework for sovereign
debt in the euro area relies on market logic. 94 As stated by the CJEU in
the Pringle case, compliance with market discipline contributes at EU
level to the attainment of a higher objective, namely maintaining the

91. Michael Ioannidis, Debt restructuring in the light of Pringle and Gauweiler –
flexibility and conditionality in ESCB LEGAL C ONFERENCE 2016 (Oct. 2016), available at
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/escblegalconference2016_201702.en.pdf?e2dea3a78
485afe4c70d5d5010f368be [https://perma.cc/2NBZ-E4NT].
92. Article 123(1) TFEU stipulates that:
Overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility with the European Central Bank
or with the central banks of the Member States [hereinafter national central banks] in
favor of Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, central governments, regional,
local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public
undertakings of Member States shall be prohibited, as shall the purchase directly from
them by the European Central Bank or national central banks of debt instruments.
TFEU, supra note 19, art. 123(1).
93. Article 125(1) TFEU reads as follows:
The Union shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments,
regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or
public undertakings of any Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial
guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project. A Member State shall not be
liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, regional, local or other
public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of
another Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint
execution of a specific project.
TFEU, supra note 19, art. 125(1). Of course, as explained above, the Pringle decision
somewhat eroded the strict no-bailout principle.
94. See Case C-370/12, Pringle v. Government of Ireland, 2012 E.C.R. 756, ¶¶ 129-47
(interpreting Article 125 of the TFEU rather broadly regarding the establishment of the ESM).
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financial stability of the monetary union. 95 The maxim of primary EU
law is thus to preserve the incentives for Member States to pursue
sound budgetary policies. 96 This rationale has to be respected not just
in good times, but especially during economic downturns, where ESM
support may become necessary. In the context of ESM lending, debt
restructuring ensures that the role of markets is preserved, which is
already reflected in the current Recital (12) of the ESM Treaty. 97
A preliminary conclusion would thus be that the current
framework for sovereign debt restructuring under the auspices of the
ESM Treaty could be transferred into EU law and that such transfer
would not raise serious legal concerns. Also, with respect to an
enhanced ESDRF, which is further discussed below, 98 the legal
assessment should not reach a different conclusion. First, giving a
stronger role to the ESM with respect to debt sustainability analyses
would follow the market discipline logic of Article 125 TFEU. Second,
enhanced contractual provisions to mitigate holdout problems would
make PSIs more orderly and should therefore serve the more general
EU objective of increasing financial stability. Third, the creation of a
dispute resolution function would mitigate the ex-post coordination
failures in debt restructuring, thereby ensuring that the adverse effects
of debt restructuring would be minimized to the greatest extent
possible.
With regard to a concrete legal basis for a crisis resolution
mechanism under EU law, Article 352 TFEU has been mentioned.99
This “flexibility clause” provides for subsidiary powers 100 that enable
the Union legislator to adopt an act of secondary legislation necessary
to attain the objectives laid down by the Treaty. 101 The application of
95. Id. ¶ 135.
96. Id. at ¶¶ 136-39.
97. But see Paliouras, supra note 67, at 120-21 (noting that it remains within the remit of
the sovereign’s discretion to make the arguably complex decision in favor or against such
measure).
98. See infra III.D., III.E., and III.F.
99. See, e.g., EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE, THE FUTURE OF ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE
IN THE EU, 2010-11, HL 124-II, at 113 (UK) (noting, however, “that it is very difficult to build
[a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism] under secondary [EU] law”).
100. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 5, June 7, 2016, 2016
O.J. (C 202) 18 [hereinafter TEU]. The principle of subsidiarity, as set out in Article 5 TEU,
stipulates that the EU may not take action unless such action is more effective in attaining the
Union’s objective than action taken at national, regional or local level. Id.
101. See TFEU, supra note 19, art. 352. Article 352 requires the European Commission to
propose a certain act, which the Council of the European Union has to adopt unanimously and
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Article 352 TFEU in respect of the establishment of an ESDRF poses
challenges in light of the conditions that must be met in order for it to
be activated: (i) the action must be necessary to attain one of the EU’s
objectives, (ii) no existing provision of the Treaty provides for action
to attain the objective, and (iii) the envisaged action must not lead to
the EU’s competences being extended beyond those provided for by
the Treaties. 102 The ESM would then become one of the many EU
agencies, without its own statute, its own capital, or a strong legal
status.
This analysis suggests that the optimal legal basis for an improved
crisis resolution mechanism—that includes the enhanced framework
for sovereign debt restructuring proposed herein—would be the EU
Treaties. First, as mentioned above, there are no obstacles in the current
Treaty to insert new Articles on the ESM. Second, the Treaties provides
both a legitimate and a sound legal basis for an important institution
like the ESM–be it with or without the debt restructuring features
discussed in this paper. Of course, Treaty change may remain a longterm objective. Hence, the next section argues that—over the shortterm—the ESM Treaty may be a more realistic legal basis for an
enhanced debt restructuring framework.
2. ESM Treaty
It may be necessary in the short to medium-term to capitalize on
the existing legal framework to enhance the current framework for debt
restructuring. As proposed for instance by the Committee on
International Economic Policy and Reform, the ESM Treaty may be
amended to effect certain contractual changes aimed at further
alleviating holdout inefficiencies. 103 An amendment of the ESM Treaty
would require unanimous agreement of all ESM Members (nineteen
euro area Member States) and ratification, approval or acceptance of
such amendment by these members, in accordance with their national
to which the European Parliament has to consent. National Parliaments, too, need to be involved
in the legislative process under Article 352 TFEU, albeit their consent is not required. Id.
102. Id. Moreover, resorting to Article 352 TFEU means that all actions taken by the ESM
and/or EMF must comply with the so-called Meroni doctrine, which essentially constrains the
Union legislator in respect of the creation of agencies or bodies that enjoy large discretion. For
the overview of the issues, see e.g., Pieter Van Cleynenbreugel, Meroni Circumvented? Article
114 TFEU and EU Regulatory Agencies, 21 MAASTRICHT J. EUR . & COMP. L. 64, 79-80
(2014).
103. COMMITTEE ON INT’L. ECON. POL’Y AND REFORM, REVISITING SOVEREIGN
BANKRUPTCY, (Brookings Institution, Oct. 2, 2013), 40.

820

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:3

constitutional requirements, which includes the involvement of
national parliaments in some Member States.
While, therefore, the process entails some significant political
steps, amending the ESM Treaty involves less complexity than revising
the EU Treaties, as part of which referenda may have to be held in
several euro area Member States.104 Given that the ESDRF would make
debt restructuring more transparent, rather than fundamentally
changing the market logic that is already reflected in the current ESM
Treaty, there should be no obstacles to making the amendments
suggested below.
Of course, introducing an ESDRF via the ESM Treaty means that
its scope of application would remain constrained to euro area countries
and that the concerns created by having a crisis resolution framework
outside the Treaty framework would linger on. 105 Hence, Treaty
change, which also seems warranted in several other policy fields,
should be the preferred legal vehicle for policy and lawmakers to
enhance the functioning and resilience of EMU.
3. The European Commission’s proposal to establish a European
Monetary Fund
While not directly relevant for an ESDRF, it is recalled that the
European Commission has released plans to transform the ESM into a
European Monetary Fund (“EMF”). 106 In its recent EMF proposal, the
European Commission has proposed to resort to Article 352 TFEU, as
a legal basis for establishing the EMF. 107 With this proposal, the
European Commission sent a strong signal to the co-legislators that the
strengthening of the EMU should be pursued progressively and,
importantly, by making use of the existing Treaty framework.108 Thus,
while the European Commission does not lack determination, it has
opted for a very modest proposal that reluctantly or deliberately

104. This is why many scholars consider the ESM Treaty to be the better vehicle for
sovereign debt reform; see, e.g., Lee C. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati & Ignacio Tirado, The Problem
of Holdout Creditors in Eurozone Sovereign Debt Restructurings, (Jan. 22, 2013) (working
paper),
https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5485&context=faculty
_scholarship [https://perma.cc/C5NK-K482].
105. Id. at 9.
106. Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Establishment of the European Monetary
Fund, COM (2017) 827 final (Dec. 6, 2017) [hereinafter EMF Regulation].
107. Id.
108. Id.
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overlooks some of the essential legal and economic aspects of
international crisis lending. 109
First, the European Commission proposes not to transfer Recital
(12) of the ESM Treaty into EU law, according to which an adequate
and proportionate form of debt restructuring may be considered in
exceptional cases. 110 Second, and closely linked to this point, the
European Commission did not replicate the obligation for Member
States to insert CACs in domestic government bonds in the EMF
proposal. 111 Without further delving into the politics of the ongoing
discussions, it should be noted that the EMF proposal—for whatever
reason—would introduce an even higher degree of ambiguity with
respect to the ESM’s crisis management functions.
D. Institutional Aspects
The analysis of a suitable legal framework for an ESDRF is
conducted against the backdrop of existing proposals, 112 as well as
recent jurisprudence by the CJEU and the European Court of Human
Rights (“ECtHR”). 113 The Article assumes that, regardless of the legal
basis chosen, the enhanced debt restructuring framework proposed

109. Id. Perhaps surprisingly, the European Commission’s proposal is even more muted
on the issue of government debt restructuring than the ESM Treaty: in recital (12), the ESM
Treaty states that “[i]n accordance with IMF practice, in exceptional cases an adequate and
proportionate form of private sector involvement shall be considered in cases where stability
support is provided accompanied by conditionality in the form of a macro-economic adjustment
programme.” Conversely, the EMF Statute makes no reference whatsoever to the possibility of
a debt restructuring; see Annex to the Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Establishment
of the European Monetary Fund, COM (2017) 827 final, (Dec. 6, 2017), [hereinafter Annex to
the EMF Regulation].
110. ESM Treaty, supra note 42, recital (12).
111. See EMF Regulation, supra note 100, at (52). Rather, the European Commission
noted in a Recital (52) of the EMF Regulation that ‘[t]his Regulation should not affect the
commitment agreed between the Contracting Parties to the Treaty establishing the ESM pursuant
to Article 12(3) of that Treaty, namely that collective action clauses must be included in all new
euro area government securities, with a maturity above one year, in a way which ensures that
their legal impact is identical.’ Id. However, it can be argued that, once the ESM Treaty ceases
to be in force, no obligation exists under international or Union law to insert CACs in euro area
government bonds. While the European Commission has not further explained why it chose to
propose the deletion of Article 12(3) of the ESM Treaty, its decision seems to reinforce the
negative sentiment vis-à-vis PSI, given that CACs are the most effective means to secure debt
relief.
112. Cf. Table 1.
113. See infra III.E.1.
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herein would have to comply with EU law, as well as pertinent CEJU
jurisprudence. 114
In order to attain the objective of rendering future debt
restructuring more efficient and more orderly, the ESDRF could have
four different features that build on and complement each other. These
features serve and are thereby organized under three different
functions, namely a financial, an economic and a legal function. Table
2 illustrates these features and functions and explains how they are
connected to one another. It is also noted that, akin to other proposals,
such as the famous IMF blueprint for a Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Mechanism (“SDRM”), 115 the scope of the ESDRF procedure would
only pertain to government bonds rather than other debt instruments,
such as loans or guarantees. 116

Table 2: Matching the ESDRF’s features and functions
Feature

1. Activation
of ESDRF in
case of
negative DSA

Function

Financial
function 117

Description and
objective(s)

Status quo

The activation of the
ESDRF, and thus a
government debt
restructuring, should be
required in exceptional
cases as part of an ESM
lending program, if the
Member State’s debt is

Very weak link
between debt
restructuring and
ESM financial
assistance
program (Recital
(12) ESM Treaty)

114. See, e.g., Press Release, General Court of the European Union, Judgements in Case
T-680/13, K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others v. Council and Others, and T-786/14
Bourdouvali and Others v. Council and Others, available at https://curia.europa.eu/
jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2018-07/cp180108en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LS36-966U]
(inter alia clarifying that EU institutions may be held accountable for their actions as part of
ESM financial assistance programs).
115. See Anne O. Krueger, A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring IMF
PAMPHLET SERIES, 2002, available at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/sdrm
/eng/sdrm.pdf [https://perma.cc/68C4-SQY9].
116. See Sean Hagan, Designing a Legal Framework to Restructure Sovereign Debt, 36
GEO. J. INT’L L. 299, 396.
117. See infra III.D.1.
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deemed unsustainable
by the ESM Board of
Governors (in line with
existing IMF practices).
It remains within the
government’s discretion
to activate the ESDRF
and the ESM Board of
Governors to demand a
debt restructuring: in
other words, there
should be no automatic
debt restructuring.

2. Enhanced
majority
voting
complemented
by an
emergency
procedure if a
CAC vote fails

3. Statutory
immunization
of ESM funds

Legal
function 118

A (super-)majority of
creditors must be in a
position to approve or
reject a debt
restructuring plan
against the will of a
minority of holdouts. In
exceptional cases, if a
CAC vote fails, the
Member State would
use the power to
override existing
contractual
arrangements in line
with existing
constitutional legal
limits, subject to review
by the ESDRF legal
function.

Current Euro
CACs lack full
aggregation
feature and no
emergency
procedure is in
place in case a
CAC vote fails
(repeatedly).

Legal
function 119

ESM funds disbursed to
Member States should
be protected from
litigation by
immunizing them from

No legal
safeguards exist
to protect ESM
funds from
creditor

118. See infra III.D.2.
119. See id.
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attachment orders
rendered by national
courts. This would
significantly reduce the
attractiveness for
litigious holdouts to
attack debt
restructurings that are
accompanied by ESM
financial assistance
programs.

4. Dispute
settlement
process

Legal
function 120

All vertical (creditordebtor) and horizontal
(inter-creditor) disputes,
for instance on the
equal application of the
haircut size across
different types of debt
instruments, shall be
settled by the ESDRF
legal function, i.e., a
specialized chamber at
the CJEU or a
sovereign debt
arbitration tribunal.

[Vol. 42:3

attachment
attempts.

Disputes are
currently
resolved by
national courts
resulting in
highly
fragmented
judicial review
procedures across
the euro area.

1. Financial function
Pursuant to Article 12(1) of the ESM Treaty, “[i]f indispensable
to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area as a whole and of its
Member States, the ESM may provide stability support to an ESM
Member subject to strict conditionality.” The ESM’s lending decisions
are the result of an intricate coordination procedure between different
institutions, as set out in Article 13 of the ESM Treaty. 121 However, as
120. See infra III.D.2.
121. See ESM Treaty art. 13, Feb. 2, 2012, Eur. Comm’n DOC/12/3 states that, more
specifically, stability support can only be granted after an assessment by the European
Commission, in liaison with the ECB, of: (a) the existence of a risk to the financial stability of
the euro area as a whole or of its Member States; (b) sustainability of public debt (wherever
appropriate and possible, such an assessment is expected to be conducted together with the IMF);
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mentioned above, the provisions of the ESM Treaty122 concerning
government debt restructuring are characterized by “constructive
ambiguity.” 123 This approach, albeit being the result of a deliberate
political decision at the height of the crisis, may in the medium to longterm undermine the reliability and credibility of the crisis resolution
mechanism. The lack of formal or informal rules and practices to
address situations when the Member State’s debt is deemed
unsustainable, may increase uncertainty, result in “gambles for
redemption,” and overburden the ESM in the case of large countries.124
The majority of SDRM proposals for the euro area therefore aim
at addressing this supposed “gap” in the ESM lending framework.
When juxtaposed to IMF practices, the ESM lending framework differs
on two points.


First, the IMF plays a catalytic, albeit informal, role as
facilitator of debt restructuring negotiations. While the
IMF Articles of Agreement do not require countries
seeking to access Fund assistance to restructure their
debts, the IMF encourages a member—wherever
possible—to restructure unsustainable debt without a
default. 125 Indeed, as explained by IMF staff, “[w]here
the debts being restructured are claims held by the private
sector, the debt restructuring is normally implemented at
the outset of the program or as a condition for the
program’s first review.” 126



Second, the IMF’s Lending into Arrears (“LiA”) policy
limits Fund assistance to Member States that have not

(c) the actual or potential financing needs of the ESM Member concerned. Ultimately, however,
the ESM’s Board of Governors has the sole decision-making authority to grant stability support
to an ESM Member.
122. See id., recital 12.
123. See Guntram Wolff, Europe needs a broader discussion of its future, VOXEU, (May
4, 2018), https://voxeu.org/article/europe-needs-broader-discussion-its-future (talking about the
“current constructive ambiguity on when [a] restructuring would happen”).
124. As noted above, the first version of the ESM Treaty, which never entered into force,
entailed rules to manage such situations; see Treaty Establishing the European Stability
Mechanism, supra note 55.
125. See, e.g., Sean Hagan, Maurice Obstfeld & Poul M. Thomsen, Dealing with
Sovereign Debt—The IMF Perspective, IMFB LOG (Feb. 23, 2017), https://blogs.imf.org/
2017/02/23/dealing-with-sovereign-debt-the-imf-perspective/.
126. Id.
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cleared arrears to private 127 or official creditors.128
Through the LiA policy, the IMF can influence debt
restructuring by (i) requiring a ‘haircut’ on investors’ debt
as part of the required domestic adjustment and (ii)
playing an active role in encouraging restructuring
negotiations. 129

As Table 3 illustrates, the IMF, on the basis of its LiA policy, has
developed a flexible yet clear framework to deal with situations for debt
restructurings.
Table 3: The IMF’s debt restructuring framework 130
2002 Framework

Debt is
unsustainable
Debt is
sustainable
but not with
high
probability

Definitive debt
restructuring/
official
concessional
financing 131

2010 Framework

2016 Framework

Definitive debt
restructuring/offici
al concessional
financing

Definitive debt
restructuring/
official
concessional
financing

Definitive debt
restructuring/
official
concessional
financing

Maintain non-Fund
exposure (e.g. reprofiling or official
financing) to
improve debt

127. INT’ L MON. FUND, IMF POLICY ON LENDING INTO ARREARS TO PRIVATE
CREDITORS, (1999), available at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/privcred/ [https://
perma.cc/8JJT-AQ89]. The LiA policy aims at reducing private investors’ leverage in a debt
restructuring deal by allowing the Fund to lend to countries even if arrears are outstanding. Id.
128. Reforming the Fund’s Policy on Non-Toleration of Arrears to Official
Creditors, IMF P OLICY P APER , Dec. 2015, available at https://www.imf.org/external/
np/pp/eng/2015/101515.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q3XP-D7JA].
129. Aitor Erce, Sovereign Debt Restructurings and the IMF: Implications for Future
Official Interventions 3-4 (Fed. Res. Bank of Dallas, Working Paper No. 143, Apr. 2013),
https://www.dallasfed.org/~/media/documents/institute/wpapers/2013/0143.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JW2H-3KE4].
130. See, e.g., IMF Survey: IMF Reforms Policy for Exceptional Access Lending, IMF
SURVEY, Jan. 16, 2016, available at https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/53/
sopol012916a [https://perma.cc/43YS-SM58].
131. “Official concessional financing” refers to special programs for highly indebted poor
countries, and would thus be irrelevant in the context of (highly developed) euro area economies.
For an explanation, see e.g., IMF Support for Low-Income Countries, IMF (Oct. 11, 2017),
http://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/IMF-Support-for-Low-Income-Countries
[https://perma.cc/QPD5-R6RJ].
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Invoke systemic
exemption

sustainability and
enhance safeguards
for Fund resources

Exceptional access
without debt
restructuring

Exceptional access
without debt
restructuring

Overall, one may argue that the ESM lending framework could
benefit from closer alignment with the IMF’s long-standing practices
in sovereign debt restructurings. For one, additional clarity may allow
investors to better anticipate the actions of the ESM. For another, the
burden stemming from a debt crisis in the euro area may be more
appropriately shared between the ESM, as contributor of liquidity
assistance, and the private sector’s contributions by agreeing to debt
relief measures.
To this end, one may consider introducing an LiA policy for the
ESM, as well as a stronger and more formalized role in facilitating
negotiations between the private sector and the debtor state. 132 This
could provide decisions taken by the ESM Board of Governors in this
regard with more legitimacy, given that the debtor state’s citizens as
well as affected bondholders would have more clarity on the
procedures that apply in the context of financial assistance programs in
the euro area. For this purpose, one could also revisit the first draft of
the ESM Treaty, which contains much clearer language on the
procedure that ought to apply if countries’ debt levels are deemed
unsustainable and if ESM financing is requested. 133 Finally, the ESM
may assume a more authoritative function in the context of analyzing
the sustainability of a requesting Member State’s public debt. 134 In the
recent Meseberg Declaration on the future of EMU, the governments
of Germany and France, for example, recalled that “any decision to

132. European Central Bank, supra note 15. Consequently, as mentioned in the ECB legal
opinion, one may consider clarifying the ESM Treaty to cater to the “fundamental need for the
ESM to be safeguarded against the moral hazard inherent in any crisis management
mechanism.” Id.
133. See ESM Treaty, supra note 42, art. 12(2).
134. Id. art. 13(1) (requiring the COM to assess whether the public debt of a Member State
requesting financial assistance is sustainable).
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provide ESM stability” includes a DSA. 135 Of course, what role the
ESM’s financial function may ultimately play—and how it then
interacts with other EU institutions—is to be decided on a political
level and can hardly be anticipated at the current juncture.
2. Legal function
As mentioned above, the crisis resolution mechanism under the
auspices of the ESM lacks a legal function. 136 To ensure an independent
review of debt restructuring measures by the legal function, the dispute
resolution function should not be allocated to the body that also carries
out the financial and/or economic function of the ESM.
Some may question the very rationale for a dispute resolution
mechanism. However, one important lesson from the Greek PSI is that
the EU’s common response to the crisis was subject to review at the
national level. Judges at civil or commercial courts in Germany,
Austria, and Greece, as well as investment arbitrators at the
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
(“ICSID”), were asked to assess the legality and proportionality of a
debt restructuring that had been decided at the central Union level.137
Moreover, the judgments rendered after the Greek PSI suggest that
135. Meseberg Declaration – Renewing Europe’s Promises of Security and Prosperity,
Jun. 19, 2018, available at https://archiv.bundesregierung.de/archiv-de/meta/startseite/
meseberg-declaration-1140806 [https://perma.cc/954K-HVAJ].
136. See Gianviti et al., supra note 17, at 27. Out of the proposals referred to in Table 1,
the ECRM proposed by Gianviti provides the most detailed description of a potential legal
function an ESDRF could entail. It notes the following in this context:
The legal body would have the authority to open a debt-restructuring procedure upon
the request of a euro-area sovereign borrower and upon approval by the economic
body that the debtor’s debt is actually unsustainable. It would be a common judicial
organ capable of sorting out and assessing claims by the parties, of ruling on disputes
between creditors or between a creditor and the debtor, and of enforcing the decisions
taken by the parties within the framework of the mechanism.
Id.
Moreover, Bagchi elaborates on the legal framework for a debt restructuring mechanism
in Europe, concluding that the ESM Treaty would provide the best legal basis for further reform.
See Kanad Bagchi, Proposals For a Future European State Bankruptcy Law, SAAR BLUEPRINTS
(2015), available at http://jean-monnet-saar.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Proposals-for-afuture-European-State-Bankruptcy-law.pdf [https://perma.cc/S5R7-SK6F].
137. For a typical domestic law bond of a euro area government in Ireland, see, e.g., 4.50%
Treasury Bond 2018, NTMA (Oct. 16, 2007), http://www.ntma.ie/download/government_
bonds/Ireland_4_5pc_Treasury_Bond_2018_Offering_Circular.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WKYZ4UD].
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foreign municipal courts are ill-equipped to address the intricate legal
questions that arise in sovereign debt restructurings, notably because of
the ambiguity regarding their jurisdiction, as well as the lack of
substantive rules to balance investor rights with the foreign
governments’ public interest in restructuring its public debt. 138
E.

A Dispute Resolution Mechanism for Sovereign Debt
Restructuring

Krueger, 139 in 2002, and Gianviti et al.,140 in 2010, proposed the
establishment of an independent legal body tasked with resolving both
creditor-debtor and creditor-creditor disputes that arise in the course of
a debt restructuring. 141 In the same vein, this Section presents two
different options for establishing a dispute resolution mechanism for
debt restructurings in the euro area: (i) a specialized chamber at the
CJEU, or (ii) an independent arbitration mechanism at a newlyestablished body. Such dispute resolution mechanisms would be
responsible for disputes relating to private bondholders’ claims and
would not allow the CJEU to second-guess judgments made by
creditors regarding the viability of a restructuring. 142 A dispute
resolution would, inter alia, be confronted with the following types of
claims: verification of claims for the CAC vote; bondholder claims for
performance of contract or damages in restructuring of non-CAC bonds
or if CACs fail; inter-creditor disputes that arise from an alleged
discrimination against specific bondholder classes; and disputes
relating to the interpretation and application of a CAC as well as other
clauses, such as pari passu clauses or bond acceleration clauses.

138. See, e.g., Sebastian Grund, The Legal Consequences of Sovereign Insolvency – A
Review of Creditor Litigation in Germany Following the Greek Debt Restructuring, 24
MAASTRICHT J. EUR . & COMP. L. 399 (2017) (analyzing post-PSI litigation in Germany).
Among the many reasons as to why municipal courts and investment tribunals have a very mixed
track-record are the lack of expertise, the lack of authority as well as the lack of rules that would
allow these bodies to balance the creditors’ right to repayment with the debtor’s need to reduce
the level of debt – indeed the central question of bankruptcy law.
139. See Krueger, supra note 115.
140. See Gianviti et al., supra note 17.
141. See also Bagchi, supra note 136 (advocating for an arbitration-like dispute resolution
procedure).
142. For rationale behind these limits, see Hagan, supra note 116; Gianviti et al., supra
note 17.
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1. Dispute Resolution at the CJEU
It could be argued that the CJEU would be the most appropriate
legal body to render the final decision in disputes that emerge in the
wake of a debt restructuring in the euro area before national courts.143
The CJEU is not only enshrined in EU law and enjoys strong statutory
independence, it also benefits from a high level of legitimacy, as well
as a sound governance framework. Given that the type of disputes the
CJEU would have to adjudicate as part of the ESDRF, a specialized
chamber, which would be established ad-hoc and comprise of experts
in the field of sovereign debt, seems most appropriate. 144
At the current juncture, the ESM Board of Governors and, after
some escalation, the CJEU only have jurisdiction for disputes
pertaining to the interpretation of the ESM Treaty. 145 However, this
leads to gaps. First, the ESM Treaty only includes the requirement for
the signatories to include CACs as agreed by the Economic and
Financial Committee (“EFC”)—it does not set out the details of the
CAC. 146 Second, the ESM Treaty lacks provisions that would assign
jurisdiction over disputes between the parties involved in a debt
restructuring to the CJEU, or any other (quasi-)judicial authority—this
choice is left with the Member States, which tend to choose their own
courts as dispute settlement forum. 147 Given that any ESM program
involves financial assistance from all nineteen Member States and
taking account of the multiple nationalities of holders of euro area debt

143. See Sapir & Schoenmaker, supra note 17; Louis, supra note 46. Such a separate
chamber may be established by virtue of Article 257 TFEU, which sets out the following: “[t]he
European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative
procedure, may establish specialized courts attached to the General Court to hear and determine
at first instance certain classes of action or proceeding brought in specific areas.” TFEU, supra
note 19, art. 257.
144. For some inspiration regarding the establishment of such a specialist chamber, see,
e.g., Daniel Sarmiento, The Reform of the General Court: Unleashing the Forces of Change,
EU LAW ANALYSIS (Dec. 15, 2015), http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.de/2015/12/the-reform-ofgeneral-court-unleashing.html [https://perma.cc/XC3L-D6KF]. Whether changes to the Treaty
would be required to cater for the establishment of a specialized chamber cannot be answered
conclusively.
145. See ESM Treaty, supra note 42, at art. 37; see also Federico Fabbrini, The EuroCrisis and the Courts: Judicial Review and the Political Process in Comparative Perspective,
32 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 64, 72 (2014).
146. See Antonio Sainz de Vicuña, Identical Collective Action Clauses for Different Legal
Systems: A European Model, in COLLECTIVE ACTION CLAUSES AND THE RESTRUCTURING OF
SOVEREIGN DEBT 15-26 (Klaus-Albert Bauer, Andreas Cahn & Patrick Kenadijan, eds., 2013).
147. See, e.g., Grund, supra note 34, at 255.
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securities, one could see merits in enabling bond investors and the
debtor country to make a final appeal to the CJEU. 148
The main objective of providing the CJEU with jurisdiction over
such bondholder disputes would be to mitigate externalities stemming
from divergent national court decisions, thereby fostering consistency
across the euro area. 149 Virtually all sovereign debt restructurings entail
some expropriatory element, for the debtor country needs to renegotiate
or unilaterally amend contractual agreement with its bondholders.150
Thus, delicate questions pertaining to the protection of the creditors’
property rights arise in the context of sovereign insolvency, which
requires the state’s public interest in attaining debt relief to be balanced
against the investors’ contractual right to be satisfied in full and on
time. 151 Such questions should ultimately be addressed by a judicial
authority at the European level with a view at harmonizing the standard
of legal review in euro area debt restructuring. 152
With respect to the substantive law applicable to the disputes,
relevant national, as well as EU law, could be used. In this context, it
is recalled that European (constitutional) laws have a common
denominator, which could circumscribe the legal perimeter for debt
restructuring measures: the European Convention on Human Rights
148. The problem with decentralized dispute resolution in the wake of euro area sovereign
debt restructurings is for instance discussed by Grund, see Grund, supra note 138.
149. As stated above, the question of dispute settlement would only apply in the event of
CACs failing to bind holdouts to a restructuring deal.
150. See, e.g., Julian Schumacher, Christoph Trebesch & Henrik Enderlein, Sovereign
Defaults in Court: The Rise of Creditor Litigation (CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6931,
Mar. 7, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2189997 [https://perma.cc/
3SVD-GQBT].
151. For a discussion, see, e.g., Patrick R. Wautelet, The Greek Debt Restructuring and
Property Rights. A Greek Tragedy for Investors?, (July 2, 2013) (unpublished manuscript),
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2373891 [https://perma.cc
/J8FF-Y8ZM].
152. For a similar reasoning, see Hagan, supra note 116, at 382-90. Many European courts
have adopted a broad interpretation of sovereign immunity while U.S. courts tend to look
exclusively at the contractual agreement underpinning the debt instrument and award money
judgements or injunctive remedies to any investors who undertakes to sue the insolvent
sovereign. For an overview of municipal court decisions in Europe, see, e.g., Grund, supra note
138. For US case law, see Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 573 U.S. 134 (2014);
Allied Bank Int’l. V. Banco Credito Agricola, 566 F. Supp. 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). With respect
to Greece, the German Federal Supreme Court granted immunity to Greece for its CAC Retrofit
while the Austrian Supreme Court rejected its immunity and referred the case to the CJEU to
determine the court’s jurisdiction under the relevant provisions of EU secondary law. See
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Dec. 19, 2017, XI ZR 796, 2016 (Ger.);
Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Dec. 20 2017, 10 Ob 37/17t (Austria).
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(“ECHR”). The Convention sets a certain minimum standard for the
protection of bondholders’ (property) rights and was transposed in the
domestic laws of all euro area Member States. 153 Another potential
basis for the judicial review of debt restructuring measures could be the
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (“CFR”), which belongs to EU
primary law and is thus directly enforceable against all EU Member
States. 154 However, the CFR only applies when EU law is
implemented, typically excluding its applicability in sovereign debt
restructuring cases. 155 Of course, if the ESDRF was to be enshrined in
EU law, then it may also be relevant for disputes pertaining to
sovereign debt restructurings.
In this context, the judicial review of official sector measures
taken during the European sovereign debt crisis yielded some
important insights as regards the boundaries for governments’ and/or
EU institutions’ interference with private property rights. 156 Notably,
one decision by the ECtHR and two by the CJEU shone light on the
legal relationship between private investors and sovereigns (as well as
their central banks). 157 First, following the Greek PSI, 158 the ECtHR
was confronted with several thousands of bondholder claims for
compensation for the haircut imposed by Greece. In the seminal
Mamatas v. Greece 159 case, the ECtHR clarified important
constitutional legal limits for signatories of the ECHR, holding that a
haircut on privately held government debt is necessary and
153. For disputes not related to bondholders’ property rights, the ESM Treaty, which
would then be transposed into national law, could set out certain rules, for instance on the
verification of creditor claims for the CAC vote.
154. Frank Emmert & Chandler Piche Carney, The European Union Charter of
Fundamental Rights vs. the Council of Europe Convention on Human Rights on Fundamental
Freedoms – A Comparison, 40 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1047, 1090 (2017).
155. Id. at 1171 (noting that “to the extent the Charter [of Fundamental Rights] might
provide substantially better protection, the Member States are not bound by it when adopting or
implementing their own law outside of the sphere of application of EU law”).
156. René Repasi, Judicial protection against austerity measures in the euro area: Ledra
and Mallis, 54 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 1123 (2017).
157. For a recent and compelling overview of the CJEU’s jurisprudence on sovereign debt
programs during the euro area debt crisis, see Claire Kilpatrick, The EU and Its Sovereign Debt
Programmes: The Challenges of Liminal Legality, Eur. Univ. Inst. Dep’t. of Law Working Paper
2017/14, Nov. 2017), http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/48205/LAW_2017_14.pdf?
sequence=1 [https://perma.cc/2NS3-NJ26].
158. See supra II.A. (discussing Greek debt restructuring).
159. Mamatas & Others v. Greece, No. 63066/14 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2016). More specifically,
the judgement takes account of the fact that the market value of bonds has typically dramatically
deteriorated in the run-up to a sovereign debt restructuring, implying that the face value should
no longer serve as a benchmark for the creditors’ property rights.
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proportionate if there is an imminent risk of default and the haircut does
not place an excessive burden on private investors. 160 Second, in
Accorinti v. ECB, 161 bondholders challenged the ECB’s carve-out from
the PSI of 2012. The EU General Court decided that the ECB’s
preferential treatment in a debt restructuring was justified since it
acquired the bonds in the public interest. 162 Third, in Ledra Advertising
v. European Commission and ECB, 163 the CJEU had to decide whether
EU institutions could be held liable for a haircut on Cypriot depositors,
which they required as part of the financial assistance programs to
Cyprus. 164 The CJEU found that while EU institutions must comply
with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 165 and hence respect the
right to property, such a right is not absolute and can be limited on
grounds of public interest provided that the limitations do not constitute
a disproportionate and undue interference with the very substance of
the right guaranteed. 166
With respect to the procedural rules applicable to such disputes,
the Rules of Procedure of the CJEU167 should, in principle, provide a
sufficient basis to create a specialized chamber for the resolution of
sovereign debt disputes. 168 In this context, it should be mentioned that
160. For a discussion of the judgement, see, Grund, supra note 34.
161. Case T-79/13, Accorinti & Others v. ECB, 2015 available at http://curia.europa.eu
/juris/liste.jsf?num=T-79/13 [https://perma.cc/S8CW-RXMU].
162. Id. ¶ 92.
163. Case C-8/15, Ledra Advertising v. Commission & ECB, 2016, available at
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-8/15%20P [https://perma.cc/VBX3R6P4].
164. Id. The legal basis for the challenge was under Article 340 TFEU. See TFEU, supra
note 19, art. 340. The investors’ challenged the decision by the two EU institutions to require
the Cypriot government to impose the respective losses on depositors as part of the EU’s
conditions to grant financial assistance to Cyprus.
165. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 17, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 392.
166. Ledra Advertising, states that:
In view of the objective of ensuring the stability of the banking system in the euro
area, and having regard to the imminent risk of financial losses to which depositors
with the two banks concerned would have been exposed if the latter had failed, such
measures do not constitute a disproportionate and intolerable interference impairing
the very substance of the appellants’ right to property.
Ledra Advertising, Case C-8/15 ¶74.
167. Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Union, 2012 O.J. (L 265)
1. In particular, one would need to consider amending Chapter 7 of the Rules of Procedure,
which pertain to the different formations of the Court. Id. ch. 7.
168. See, e.g., Daniel Sarmiento, Reform of the General Court: An Exercise in Minimalist
(but Radical) Institutional Reform, 19 CAMBR. YRBK. OF EUR. LEG. STUD. 236 (2017).
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the proposal to introduce specialized chambers as part of the
institutional reform of the EU General Court, the CJEU’s first instance,
was ultimately rejected. 169 However, the discussion about advantages
of specialized chambers will continue, not least since the CJEU itself
has changed its position on the issue in the past. 170 Even if a specialized
chamber will not see the light of day, conferring jurisdiction over
government bondholder disputes to the CJEU would go far in ensuring
harmonized dispute settlement procedures in cross-border sovereign
debt disputes that inevitably emanate from debt restructurings—
indeed, the lack of such mechanism was one of the central obstacles to
establishing an SDRM on the international level. 171
2. Establishing a Sovereign Debt Arbitration Mechanism
Another potential forum for the settlement of sovereign debtrelated disputes would be an arbitral tribunal. In this respect, the late
Professor Sandrock argued in favor of a stronger role for international
arbitration in settlement of sovereign debt disputes against the
backdrop of the Greek crisis. 172 Sandrock essentially argued that
international arbitration has unjustifiably been dismissed by
policymakers as a means of dispute resolution when sovereign debt is
to be restructured. 173 Others have, for instance, discussed the potential
advantages of arbitration in the context of the recent Puerto Rican debt
restructuring. 174
But how could such arbitration mechanism credibly be designed
in the context of an ESDRF? First, a specialized arbitral institution for
sovereign debt disputes could be established at the ICSID, which has a
169. Id. at 242.
170. Id. at 242-34.
171. Notably, see Hagan, supra note 116, 385 (noting that “[a]s work on the SDRM
proposal progressed, it became increasingly clear that, no matter how streamlined its design,
there would need to be a number of technical rules that it would be inappropriate to specify in
the treaty itself”).
172. See generally Otto Sandrock, The Case for More Arbitration When Sovereign Debt
is to Be Restructured: Greece as an Example¸ 23 AM. REV. INT’L. ARB. 507 (2012).
173. See id. Others have been less positive and warned that subsuming sovereign bonds
under the definition of “investment” may incentivize holdout investors to leverage their
bargaining position by invoking Bilateral Investment Treaties (“BITs”) against countries that
seek to restructure their debts. See, e.g., Michael Waibel, Opening Pandora’s Box: Sovereign
Bonds in International Arbitration, 101 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 711, 716-17 (2007).
174. Melika Hadziomerovic, Note, An Arbitral Solution: A Private Law Alternative to
Bankruptcy for Puerto Rico, Territories, and Sovereign Nations, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1263,
1285 (2017).
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long-standing history in adjudicating investment-related disputes, 175 or
at least emulate its elaborate rules of procedure. 176 For instance,
arbitrators could be selected from a preconceived list of experts in the
field, as is the procedure for ICSID arbitration.177 In addition, one may
consider requiring a panel to consist of arbitrators from the country
which underwent a debt restructuring, as well as arbitrators whose
nationality is identical to the claimants’, though this is currently not the
procedure for arbitration cases before the ICSID.
A more contentious issue concerns the substantive law which the
specialized arbitral tribunal would have to apply. 178 In this context,
recent free trade agreements (“FTAs”), such as the Comprehensive
Economic and Trade Agreement (“CETA”),179 could serve as a source
of inspiration, given that they include provisions on sovereign debt
restructurings.
CETA for example
protects “negotiated
restructurings,” 180 i.e., restructurings that have been approved by
seventy-five percent of investors, from arbitration in investor-state
tribunals. In light of this provision, two conclusions may be drawn.
First, CETA limits investor-state arbitration to cases where the debt
exchange did not attract sufficient investor support (referred to as
“negotiated restructuring”), introducing a “check” on states not to

175. See, e.g., ANTONIO R. PARRA, THE HISTORY OF ICSID (2nd ed. 2018); Andreas F.
Lowenfeld, The ICSID Convention: Origins and Transformation, 38 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
47 (2009).
176. For different views, see Sandrock, supra note 172, at 543; Waibel, supra note 173, at
728 (rejecting the role of investment arbitration).
177. See Chiara Giorgetti, Who Decides Who Decides in International Investment
Arbitration, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 431, 486, 447 (2013) (noting that “[i]n his choice of arbitrators,
the Chairman of the ICSID Administrative Council is restricted to those people listed in a Panel
of Arbitrators, which contains names of arbitrators selected by ICSID Contracting Parties and
by the Chairman”).
178. For some a discussion of issues that may arise in this regard, see, e.g., Gregory D.
Makoff, Simplifying Sovereign Bankruptcy – A Voluntary Single Host Country Approach to
SDRM Design, CIGI PAPERS NO. 76, Sept. 2015, available at https://www.cigionline.org/
sites/default/files/cigi_paper_76_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/9YKS-3T5N].
179. Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement, Can.-E.U., Oct. 30, 2016
[hereinafter CETA].
180. According to Annex 8-B CETA, a “negotiated restructuring means the restructuring
or rescheduling of debt of a Party that has been effected through (a) a modification or amendment
of debt instruments, as provided for under their terms, including, their governing law, or (b) a
debt exchange or other similar process in which the holders of no less than seventy-five per cent
of the aggregate principal amount of the outstanding debt subject to restructuring have consented
to such debt exchange or other process.” Id. at 332.
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restructure opportunistically. 181 Crucially, the protection of negotiated
restructurings is independent from the success of a potential CAC vote,
implying that the state may also resort to other (contractual or statutory)
measures as long as this is in agreement with a supermajority of
investors. 182 Second, CETA implicitly acknowledges that investorstate arbitration may be a means to resolve disputes related to sovereign
debt restructuring where contractual or other mechanisms have
failed. 183 Consequently, under certain conditions, a CETA tribunal
may—on the basis of the text of CETA—decide whether debt
restructuring measures have unduly expropriated sovereign debt
holders.
While an in-depth review of the merits of sovereign debt
arbitration would go beyond the scope of this Article, it is clear that
policymakers have already recognized a potential role for arbitration in
balancing the investors’ and the states’ interests during economic and
financial crisis. 184 Whether a similar logic could apply to sovereign
debt restructuring seems worth exploring.

181. See, e.g., Kei Nakajima, An Elusive Safeguard with Loopholes: Sovereign Debt and
Its Negotiated Restructuring in International Investment Agreements in the Age of Global
Financial Crisis, 2016 INT’L REV. L. 1, 20 (2016).
182. This conclusion can be drawn from an analysis of Annex X of the CETA, which does
not refer to the use of CACs but defines “negotiated restructurings” broadly:
“negotiated restructuring” means the restructuring or rescheduling of a debt
instrument that has been effected through (i) a modification or amendment of such
debt instrument, as provided for under its terms, or (ii) a comprehensive debt
exchange or other similar process in which the holders of no less than 75 percent of
the aggregate principal amount of the outstanding debt under such debt instrument
have consented to such debt exchange or other process.
CETA, supra note 179, annex X.
183. This follows from the fact that the CETA only excludes “negotiated restructurings”
from the scope of dispute settlements in Annex X – argumentum e contrario, all other (coercive)
government debt restructurings can be challenged before a CETA arbitration tribunal. Id. annex
X.
184. For a discussion of the experience with CACs in the euro area and the envisaged
introduction of single-limb CACs, see Christoph Grosse Steffen, Sebastian Grund & Julia
Schumacher, Collective Action Clauses in the Euro Area: A Law and Economic Analysis of the
Airst Five Years, CAP. MKTS. L.J. (forthcoming 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3318570 [https://perma.cc/G8EM-8KQF].

2019]

SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING
F.

837

Enhancing the Contractual Framework
1. Enhancing the Euro CAC

To make debt restructuring more orderly, the current Euro CAC
could be revised. 185 An enhanced Euro CAC could be modeled on the
CAC standard developed by the International Capital Market
Association (“ICMA”) for international sovereign bonds, 186 which,
according to the IMF, is now used in the majority of new bond
issuances. 187 The key rationale of enhancing the Euro CAC is to ensure
the success of a debt restructuring by reducing the incentives for
holdout behavior. 188 This does not mean that debt restructuring would
become more likely but rather that, if the decision to restructure debt is
taken, the operation can be carried out in a smooth manner. 189 The
different contractual enhancements presented in the following sections
all cater to this overarching objective.
a. Introducing aggregation features and a single-limb voting
procedure
To align the Euro CAC with the international standard, it would
have to be equipped with more robust aggregation features designed to
alleviate holdout inefficiencies. 190 The two-limb voting process of the
current Euro CAC, which requires the debtor to achieve majority
approval in each individual series and for the aggregate of outstanding
bonds, would be replaced by a single-limb mechanism. 191 As a result,
185. See infra III.F.1. for an analysis of the Euro CACs’ arguable shortcomings.
186. See ICMA, supra note 76.
187. See INT’ L MON. FUND, supra note 76.
188. Mark Sobel, Merits of single-limb CACs, OFFICIAL MONETARY & FIN. INSTITUTIONS
FORUM, July 10, 2018, available at https://www.omfif.org/analysis/commentary/2018/july/
merits-of-single-limb-cacs/ [https://perma.cc/6ZEU-9QLA].
189. The benefits of resorting to CACs to restructure sovereign debt stem from the
possibility to “cram-down” dissenting minority holdouts. CACs do not mean that the country is
more likely to default; for an overview, see, e.g., Christian Hofmann, Sovereign-Debt
Restructuring in Europe under the New Model Collective Action Clauses, 49 TEX. INT’L L. J.
385, 444 (2014).
190. For the advantages of single-limb CACs over double-limb CACs, see id. at 404
(noting that “[the Euro CAC] establishes two conditions to be met cumulatively for the
modification of the debt terms to succeed if the cross-series modification clause is invoked: A
certain percentage of the accumulated bond debt that is subject to the aggregated vote must
approve, and, in addition, a certain number of bondholders of each series must accept.”). For
other design flaws in the Euro CAC, see Giuseppe Bianco, Collective Action Clauses in the
Eurozone: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back, 16 EUR. J. L. REFORM 713, 727 (2014).
191. See, e.g., DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK, supra note 14.
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a proposed bond modification, and hence the restructuring plan, would
have to be approved by a (super-) majority of seventy-five percent of
the aggregate principal amount of the outstanding bonds. 192 This would
reduce the likelihood of holdouts acquiring smaller series of sovereign
bonds with a view at blocking the modification of these series under a
double-limb voting mechanism.
Moreover, while the Euro CAC allows for “partial cross-series
modifications,” aimed at avoiding the blocking of small series, the
procedure seems overly complex and difficult to use in practice.193 In
essence, this type of cross-series modification rests on a legal fiction,
according to which the modification of certain blocked series is deemed
successful if, within a pre-defined amount of certain other series, the
required majorities are reached. 194 While this provision allows the debt
restructuring to go ahead, holdouts will still hold the original claim and
are not bound to the debt restructuring deal. 195 The ICMA Model CAC,
in contrast, does not need such complex legal fictions to resolve
holdout problems in individual series; it simply binds all dissenting
bondholders to the proposed modifications. 196 With the objectives of
increasing transparency, decreasing complexity, and ensuring the
integrity of the CAC voting procedure, it seems warranted to also move
to a single-limb, fully aggregated CAC standard in the euro area.197
Indeed, as Sobel has recently noted, “[s]ingle-limb CACs will help
tackle the hold-out creditor problem and limit ensuing litigation, which
have often bedeviled restructurings” and “[e]uro area governments
would be well advised to modernize the CACs in their sovereign bonds
by including the single-limb feature.” 198
Indeed, if designed properly, an enhanced Euro CAC can
guarantee a sufficient level of investor protection. 199 In the euro area,
192. See ICMA, supra note 76. For a discussion of the features of the ICMA CAC, see
Leland Goss, Sovereign Debt Restructuring Made Easy, 32 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 62, 63 (2013).
193. See ESDM, supra note 69, art. 2.4.
194. See Hofmann, supra note 189, at 404-05.
195. For an explanation of this feature, see ALLEN & OVERY, GOVERNMENT BOND
RESTRUCTURING “MADE IN GERMANY”: THE RISE OF ANTI-HOLDOUT CLAUSES (2012),
available at http://www.allenovery.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/Government%20bond%20
restructuring.pdf [https://perma.cc/HJQ7-USCB].
196. See ICMA, supra note 76, at 4.
197. In support of this suggestion, see, e.g., Bénassy-Quéré et al., supra note 27, at 13.
198. Sobel, supra note 188.
199. Regarding the enforceability of CACs in Europe, cf. Assenagon Asset Management
SA v. Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Ltd [2012] EWHC 2090 (Eng.) (in this decision, the
High Court of England and Wales concluded that in certain, extreme cases, resolutions passed
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all countries have ratified the ECHR, which means that the same
minimum level of protection of property rights applies in the whole
currency union. 200 In this regard, the ECtHR has recently confirmed the
legality of applying a single-limb CAC with full aggregation features
in a sovereign debt restructuring inside the euro area. 201 Against this
backdrop, it seems excessive to dismiss the enforceability of CACs on
constitutional grounds. 202 Finally, the Euro CAC could—as does the
ICMA CAC—leave the issuer the option to either apply a single or a
double-limb voting mechanism, should there be jurisdiction-specific
legal constraints with respect to conducting a single vote that applies
across all series.
Heeding these calls, euro area finance ministers rendered a
political declaration of intent at the Eurogroup meeting of December 4,
2018 “to introduce single limb collective action clauses (CACs) by
2022 and to include this commitment in the ESM Treaty.” 203 This
political agreement will need to be translated into a legal text in the
near future. 204
b. Majority voting on bond acceleration
An enhanced Euro CAC should also restrict the acceleration of
the bond’s principal payment in the event of default to a predefined
majority of investors. The ICMA CAC already entails majority voting
requirements with respect to the acceleration, requiring twenty-five
percent of bondholders to consent. 205 With respect to euro area

by the majority of bondholders to expropriate minority bondholders may be illegal under English
contract law).
200. See Emmert & Carney, supra note 154.
201. See Mamatas & Others v. Greece, No. 63066/14 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2016).
202. Indeed, the aggregated CAC retrofitted to local-law bonds in the Greek PSI featured
a 66.67% threshold for bond modifications to be successful. This means minority investors’
rights were affected even more strongly than under the 75% threshold we propose in this paper
(and which has become the standard for international sovereign bonds).
203. Council of the EU, Term Sheet on the European Stability Mechanism Reform (Dec.
4
2018),
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/37267/esm-term-sheet-041218_final_
clean.pdf [https://perma.cc/CMZ9-E6QL].
204. For a general analysis of (single-limb) CACs, see Grosse Steffen et al., supra note
184.
205. See ICMA, supra note 76, at Standard Aggregated Collective Action Clauses
(“CACs”) for the Terms and Conditions of Sovereign Notes 16. The provision states the
following:
If any of the following events (each an “Event of Default”) occurs and is continuing:
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government bonds, this threshold could be set even higher, e.g., at fifty
percent. As a consequence, holdout investors would be discouraged
from buying distressed debt. This is because holdouts may accelerate a
bond to demand repayment of interest and principal. 206 If acceleration
becomes subject to approval by a certain number of investors, which is
the case for most emerging market sovereign bond contracts, 207 the
appeal to engage in such tactics is significantly reduced. 208
The EFC Sub-Committee on EU Sovereign Debt Markets
(“ESDM”) that negotiated the Euro CAC in 2011 found that such
provisions may run into serious legal difficulties in some euro area
Member States, without however further specifying the nature and
extent of these problems. 209 Given that the ICMA acceleration clause
is deemed consistent with English and New York law, and given that
these two jurisdictions have a relatively high standard of minority
creditor and shareholder protection 210, there should be few legal
concerns that acceleration features would infringe national
constitutional law in the euro area. 211 Of course, further analysis may
be required to confirm this assumption.
then the holders of at least 25 per cent. in aggregate principal amount of the
outstanding Notes may, by notice in writing to the Issuer (with a copy to the [Fiscal
Agent/Trustee/other bondholder representative]), declare all the Notes to be
immediately due and payable, whereupon they shall become immediately due and
payable at their principal amount together with accrued interest without further action
or formality. Notice of any such declaration shall promptly be given to all other
Noteholders by the Issuer.
206. For the mechanics of acceleration clauses, see Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric
A. Posner, The Evolution of Contractual Terms in Sovereign Bonds, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 131,
147, 180 (2012). According to the authors, acceleration provisions vary a great deal. Some allow
individual creditors to accelerate their obligations should an Event of Default occur. Most bonds
today, however, provide that a vote of twenty-five percent of the bonds is required before
acceleration can take place.
207. Id. at 163.
208. Indeed, the holdout creditor could only sue for the (immediate) repayment of coupon
payments, which is typically dwarfed by the principal amount. Holding out would therefore
become even more risky and financially unattractive, as the holdout would have to either buy a
much larger stake in the sovereign’s debt stock or convince other investors to join forces.
209. See ESDM, supra note 69, at 7. Contra, Hofmann, supra note 189, at 405-06
(suggesting that the Euro CAC also features acceleration provisions, which the authors
could however not confirm when analyzing the legal text of the Euro CAC).
210. For an overview, see Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer
& Robert W. Wishny, Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1155 (1998).
211. This assumption presents the Authors’ view. Of course, whether acceleration features
would clear potential constitutional law obstacles in every single Member State would require
further in-depth research that would go beyond the scope of this Article.
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c. Majority voting on stays of enforcement
As proposed by the IMF in 2002 in the context of the SDRM, an
enhanced Euro CAC could enable a certain pre-defined majority of
creditors, e.g., twenty-five or fifty percent, to impose a stay on
enforcement proceedings by individual bondholders. 212 Stays are
ubiquitous in domestic insolvency law in order to prevent a “rush to the
courthouse” by creditors trying to attach the debtor’s (remaining)
assets. 213 In the sovereign context, a stay on an enforcement action is
no doubt contentious and should be narrowly circumscribed to mitigate
any adverse effects on financial transactions, especially those
pertaining to derivative contracts, most notably credit default swaps
(“CDS”). 214
At the same time, as the Greek PSI illustrated, even if a country
opts for a market-friendly approach by retrofitting CACs, CDS are
likely to be triggered. 215 If a majority of creditors decides to impose an
enforcement moratorium with the objective of facilitating negotiations,
the biggest threat would stem from the size of the CDS exposures,
given that they could bankrupt the CDS protection seller. 216 Again
though, as the Greek case implies, the CDS exposures may be
overestimated, as well as the contagion risks inherent to a default event
being triggered in one euro area country. 217
212. For the IMF’s proposal, see Hagan, supra note 116, at 363-68. Hagan notes that the
context of the IMF’s SDRM proposal, the idea of an automatic stay was originally conceived.
However, it was perceived in the course of the negotiations that an automatic stay would
constitute an unnecessary and inappropriate shift in legal leverage from creditors to debtors-one
which, on the margin, could encourage (or be perceived as encouraging) defaults by debtors. Id.
213. See generally, Frank R. Kennedy, The Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy, 11 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 175, 268 (1978).
214. See Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, CDS Zombies, 13 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 347,
377 (2012).
215. Id.
216. See id., at 350-46.
217. For an analysis, see, e.g., Grzegorz Halaj, Tuomas Peltonen & Martin Schleicher,
How Did the Greek Credit Event Impact the Credit Default Swap Market?, 35 J. FIN. STABILITY
136, 158 (2018) (finding very little discernible direct impact of the Greek credit event on CDS
spreads overall, which provides evidence that the credit event was well anticipated by most
market participants). If anything, the main lesson from the Greek Crisis has been to better
regulate sovereign CDS. The Greek Crisis could be compared with the EU’s “Short Selling
Regulation.” For a description of the Short Selling Regulation, see Regulation 236/2012 of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 on Short Selling and Certain Aspects
of Credit Default Swaps, 2012 O.J. (L 86) 1. This Regulation essentially prohibits certain
speculative transactions with sovereign CDS, referred to as “naked” or “uncovered” short
selling. Id.
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In any event, a stay on enforcement, agreed upon by a certain
majority of investors, could significantly increase the prospect of a
successful negotiation outcome, for uncooperative investors have little
incentive to launch asset attachment attempts if their claims are, by
virtue of contract, not enforceable for a certain limited period of
time. 218 Some lessons may also be learned from the handling of very
recent cases of sovereign debt distress, notably the case of Puerto
Rico. 219 The law adopted by the US Congress to address Puerto Rico’s
debt crisis goes even further and imposes an automatic stay on all
creditor action with the objective of facilitating an orderly debt
restructuring. 220 While Puerto Rico cannot be compared to a euro area
Member State, given the ambiguous constitutional relationship with the
United States, the stay serves as an insightful example as to how
holdout inefficiencies can be ex-ante deterred. 221
218. A rational holdout creditor would weigh her chances to successfully attach sovereign
assets with costs for pursuing such enforcement attempts. If the enforcement is ex-ante
restricted, it would not make economic sense for the holdout to launch proceedings.
219. For a general overview of the Puerto Rican debt restructuring, see Mitu Gulati &
Robert K. Rasmussen, Puerto Rico and the Netherworld of Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 91 S.
CAL. L. REV. 133, at ii (2017).
220. For an overview of Puerto Rico’s debt restructuring, see generally Lorraine S.
McGowen, The Impact of the New Restructuring Law on Puerto Rico Creditors, HARV. L. SCH.
F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (Aug. 20, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2016/08/20/the-impact-of-the-new-restructuring-law-on-puerto-rico-creditors
[https://perma.cc/8L78-W32S] (noting that “the automatic stay operates as a general moratorium
and court-ordered injunction, and no court order is is necessary as the injunction is automatically
triggered by the enactment of [Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act
(“PROMESA”)].
221. More specifically, § 2194 of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic
Stability Act imposes a stay on acts, such as:
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of
process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the
Government of Puerto Rico that was or could have been commenced before the
enactment of this chapter, or to recover a Liability Claim against the Government of
Puerto Rico that arose before the enactment of this chapter;
(2) the enforcement, against the Government of Puerto Rico or against property of the
Government of Puerto Rico, of a judgment obtained before the enactment of this
chapter;
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the Government of Puerto Rico or of
property from the Government of Puerto Rico or to exercise control over property of
the Government of Puerto Rico;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the Government
of Puerto Rico;
Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act, 48 U.S.C.S. §
2194(a)(1-4).
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This said, in a monetary union of financially highly developed
economies, the euro area, subtler and less invasive methods to achieve
the objective of a stay may be preferable. In this respect, the UK Debt
Relief Act 2010 222 could serve as a blueprint for European lawmakers.
In essence, this UK law limits the amount recoverable in respect of a
claim against the sovereign debtor to the level agreed internationally as
part of a debt relief deal. 223 Consequently, holdouts may not force a
country into paying more than it had paid to the restructured creditors,
thereby ex-ante reducing the appeal of engaging in speculative
litigation. 224 While the UK Debt Relief Act applies to countries that
have participated in the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (“HIPC”)
initiative, its technique could well be emulated in the ESM Treaty
framework. 225 For instance, one may consider stipulating in the ESM
Treaty that creditors shall not recover more than the market value of
their bonds at the time of the restructuring offer being accepted by
creditors. This would discourage holdout litigation in the euro area.
2. Immunizing ESM funds from holdout litigation
In 2013, Buchheit et al. put forward an elegant and
straightforward proposal to improve the euro area crisis resolution
mechanism, which would complement the ESDRF advanced herein.226
In essence, they propose to insert a new provision into the ESM Treaty,
which immunizes the assets of a euro area country from creditor
For further analysis, see, e.g., Michael Cooley, PROMESA Shields Puerto Rico Behind a
New Automatic Stay, BRYAN CAVE LEIGHTON PAISNER: GLOBAL RESTRUCTURING &
INSOLVENCY DEV (July 21, 2016), http://bankruptcycave.com/promesa-shields-puerto-ricobehind-a-new-automatic-stay/ [https://perma.cc/JL9N-333R].
222. Debt Relief (Developing Countries) Act 2010, c. 22, § 3 (UK) [hereinafter UK Debt
Relief Act]. Note that a similar act has been introduced in Belgium and France too; see Lucas
Wozny, National Anti-Vulture Funds Legislation: Belgium’s Turn, 2017 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
697, 747 (2017).
223. For an analysis, see UK Debt Relief Act, supra note 222, § 3.
224. Wozny, supra note 222, at 742.
225. Of course, one would need to analyze specific constitutional constraints to imposing
limits on bondholder recovery rights in the nineteen-euro area Member States. However,
positive signals regarding the legality of such recovery limits come from Belgium, where the
Constitutional Court has rejected a legal challenge against a law that limits the enforcement of
sovereign debt in specific circumstances. See Bodo Ellmers & Antonio Gambini, Justice
prevails at the Belgian Constitutional Court: Vulture law survives challenge by NML Capital,
Eurodad Newsletter (June 5, 2018), https://eurodad.org/vulture-funds-blog [https://perma.cc/
2GSD-7LRF].
226. Buchheit et al., supra note 104, at 8. A similar proposal has been put forward by
Bagchi, supra note 136, at 15.
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attachment if that country was engaged in an ESM-supported
adjustment program. 227 As the authors outline, inserting such a
provision would ensure that financial support provided by the ESM is
not diverted to the repayment of existing debt obligations, that
beneficiary states can deflate the expectations of holdouts to extract
preferential treatment and that the euro area becomes a safe harbor for
recipient states to hold assets and conduct their financial affairs during
times of crisis. 228 Such immunization of ESM funds would provide for
an additional layer of protection, complementing other elements of the
ESDRF and with the overall goal of minimizing holdout inefficiencies
and legal uncertainty. Given that the insertion of such a provision
would simply require an amendment to the ESM Treaty and that there
are international precedents for using such technique in the context of
debt restructurings, 229 the authors of this Article strongly support the
proposal.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The purpose of this Article is to contribute to the debate on
reforming the EMU. More specifically, it discusses the legal aspects of
government debt restructurings in the euro area and analyzes how a
revised framework could make restructurings more orderly, fair, and
predictable. While several proposals have been advanced in existing
literature, the legal intricacies associated with such mechanism have
227. COMM. ON INT’L. ECON. POL’Y AND REFORM, supra note 103, at 40. The Committee
suggests adding the following Article to the ESM Treaty:
Immunity from judicial process
1. The assets and revenue streams of an ESM Member receiving stability support
under this Treaty which are held in, originate from, or pass through the jurisdiction
of an ESM Member shall not be subject to any form of attachment, garnishment,
execution, injunctive relief, or similar forms of judicial process, in connection with a
claim based on or arising out of a debt instrument that was eligible to participate in a
restructuring of the debt of the beneficiary ESM Member after the effective date of
this Treaty.
2. The immunities provided in the preceding paragraph shall automatically expire
when all amounts due to the ESM from the beneficiary ESM Member have been
repaid in full.
Id. at 40.
228. Id. at 8-9.
229. See Buchheit et al., supra note 104, at 9-10 (noting that the European Union
immunized Iraqi assets in 2003 in order to facilitate a debt restructuring in Iraq without
interference by holdout investors).
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received little to no attention. The idea behind this paper is our
conviction that the unparalleled degree of legal, political, and economic
integration between euro area Member States would allow for a more
progressive approach to enhancing government debt restructuring than
is currently foreseen at the European or international level.
A well-designed framework could fulfil several functions. On the
one hand, it may cater for a more transparent approach to address
sovereign debt sustainability crises, replacing a regime that is fraught
with ambiguity that is dangerous rather than constructive. On the other
hand, it could promote an orderly process and reduce the costs of
sovereign debt restructuring by shielding sovereigns from disruptive
legal action whilst ensuring an appropriate degree of protection for
holders of euro area debt securities. From a technical point of view,
euro area governments may resort to existing statutory instruments,
such as the ESM Treaty, or indeed EU law, to mandate the inclusion of
enhanced contractual clauses in government bonds. Complementing
these contractual improvements, this Article also discusses two options
for a dispute settlement mechanism: a specialized chamber at the CJEU
or an arbitral tribunal.
One should not fall prey to the illusion that inefficiencies, risks,
and deadweight losses associated with government debt restructurings
can be “regulated away.” However, an informed discussion about the
ways in which the existing framework can be improved seems
indispensable to ensure a more resilient, transparent, and legitimate
framework to address sovereign debt crises in the euro area.
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